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STAKEHOLDER THEORY IN CORPORATE LAW:
HAS IT GOT WHAT IT TAKES?
Andrew Keay*
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been much debate for many years regarding what
should be the objective of the large public corporation.  This issue is
important for a number of reasons, not least of which is that the theory
nominated will underpin corporate governance and dictate, to a large
extent, the kind of corporate governance system that will exist.  As far
as the corporation’s objective is concerned, two theories have been
dominant: the shareholder primacy theory and the stakeholder theory.
The former is operative in what I will call “Anglo-American jurisdic-
tions,” namely jurisdictions that model their law and practice on one or
both of the United States or the United Kingdom.  Jurisdictions falling
within this category also include Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
The stakeholder theory operates in many continental European and
East Asian countries.  Prime examples are Germany and Japan.
Notwithstanding the fact that the United States, United King-
dom, and other Anglo-American jurisdictions regularly embrace share-
holder primacy, there are many who feel that some of these
jurisdictions are moving towards more of a stakeholder approach to
corporate governance.  This is due to a number of factors such as: the
constituency statutes enacted in more than forty U.S. states;1 the
* LL.B; M.Div; LL.M; PhD; Professor of Corporate and Commercial Law, Centre
for Business Law and Practice, School of Law, University of Leeds, England and
Barrister-at-Law (Lincoln’s Inn).
1 The literature is too voluminous to cite in full. See Andrew Keay, Moving To-
wards Stakeholderism? Constituency Statutes, Enlightened Shareholder Value and
All That: Much Ado about Little? (Univ. of Leeds School of Law Centre for Busi-
ness Law and Practice, Working Paper, 2010) available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1530990, for a recent discussion of these statutes.  For more detailed
discussions of these statutes, see generally Edward S. Adams & John H. Mathe-
son, A Statutory Model for Corporate Constituency Concerns, 49 EMORY L.J. 1085
(2000); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Stat-
utes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971 (1992); William J. Carney, Does Defining Constituencies
Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 385 (1990); Timothy L. Fort, The Corporation as Medi-
ating Institution: An Efficacious Synthesis of Stakeholder Theory and Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 173 (1997); James J. Hanks, Jr.,
Playing with Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes in the 1990s, 21 STETSON
L. REV. 97 (1991); Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claim: Obli-
gations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84
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growth of literature in Anglo-American countries advocating stake-
holder theory written by a wide range of people, including academics
from various disciplines, lawyers, and directors and the assertion that
the concerns raised by the stakeholder debate in the 1990s have not
disappeared or been addressed;2 the advent of enlightened shareholder
value in the U.K. Companies Act of 2006; U.S. cases which specifically
hold that no duty is imposed on directors to maximize shareholder
wealth;3 research which indicates there has been greater use of stake-
holder rhetoric in documents and communications of large U.S. public
corporations;4 two critically important decisions by the Supreme Court
of Canada5 in the past five years which appear to reject the idea that
shareholder primacy is mandatory for Canadian corporations and that
directors are permitted to consider a wide range of constituent inter-
ests; recent empirical research from a study of Australian directors
which found “the majority of directors had a ‘stakeholder’ understand-
ing of their obligations;”6 the increased amount of social reporting;7
CORNELL L. REV. 1266 (1999); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical
Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579
(1992); Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee Gov-
ernance, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1227 (2004); Eric W. Orts, Beyond Sharehold-
ers: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14
(1992); Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and
False Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85 (1999); Steven M.H. Wallman, The Proper
Interpretation of Corporate Constituency Statutes and Formulation of Director Du-
ties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 163 (1991); Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for
Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 2253 (1990); Anthony Bisconti, Note, The Double Bottom
Line: Can Constituency Statutes Protect Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck
in Revlon Land?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765 (2009); Kathleen Hale, Note, Corporate
Law and Stakeholders: Moving Beyond Stakeholder Statutes, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 823
(2003).
2 John Armour et al., Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate
Governance, 41 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 531, 549–50 (2003).
3 See, e.g., Paramount Commc’n Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989);
see also Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Share-
holder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 650–51; Fordham Law Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 105 (2006), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=878391(last
visited Mar. 1, 2010) (discussing how the directors’ duty to maximize shareholder
wealth is limited).
4 Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhet-
oric on Corporate Norms, 31 J. CORP. L. 675, 676 (2006); Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier
Said Than Done? A Corporate Law Theory for Actualizing Social Responsibility
Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REV. 771, 774 (2007).
5 People’s Dept Stores v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 (Can.); BCE Inc. v. 1976 De-
bentureholders [2008] 3 S.C.R 560 (Can.).
6 Meredith Jones, Shelley Marshall, Richard Mitchell & Ian M. Ramsay, Company
Directors’ Views Regarding Stakeholders, Research Report, University of Mel-
bourne, available at http://cclsr.law.unimelb.edu.au/go/centre-activities/research/
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and the comments of some writers questioning whether the dominance
of the shareholder primacy theory may be problematic due to recent
developments in law and finance.8  Furthermore, in 2000 many pro-
claimed that the Anglo-American corporate governance system based
on shareholder primacy had become paramount and the European
stakeholder systems were converging to the Anglo-American ap-
proach.9  However, since 2000, the world has witnessed the collapse of
Enron and Worldcom; and, more recently, the demise of major banks
such as Northern Rock in the United Kingdom, Lehman Bros in the
United States, and the provision of government support for other
banks and financial institutions, to such a degree that there is the vir-
tual part nationalisation of several U.K. banks.  These recent develop-
ments could well lead to a change of direction, since there is much
questioning of the financial regulatory system in Anglo-American ju-
risdictions, and corporate governance in general.  It is arguable that
some of the problems to hit financial institutions have laid bare the de-
ficiencies in corporate governance in Anglo-American jurisdictions.10
This article analyzes whether stakeholder theory should over-
take shareholder primacy as the leading theory in Anglo-American ju-
risdictions.  Specifically, the article examines the arguments
propounded in support of stakeholder theory and evaluates the
strength of these arguments with the aim of determining if there is
sufficient justification for the theory to become wholeheartedly em-
braced in Anglo-American jurisdictions.
The article is structured as follows.  Part II offers a brief back-
ground of the stakeholder theory.  This is followed by an explanation of
what the theory actually stands for.  Part IV examines the rationales
given for the theory’s existence as well as the leading arguments put
research-reports-and-research-papers/index/cfm (“Centre Activities” hyperlink to
“Research” and follow hyperlink “Research Reports and Research Papers”) (last
visited Mar. 1, 2010) (containing research findings undertaken by members of the
Corporate Governance and Workplace Partnerships Project at the University of
Melbourne).
7 See generally Steen Thomsen, The Convergence of Corporate Governance Sys-
tems and European and Anglo-American Standards, 4 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 31
(2003).
8 Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money, 60 STAN. L. REV.
1309, 1311 (2008); Frederick Tung, The New Death of Contract: Creeping Corpo-
rate Fiduciary Duties for Creditors, 57 EMORY L.J. 809, 853 (2008).
9 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001).
10 Cf. Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance ‘Fail’ During the 2008 Stock
Market Meltdown?  The Case of the S & P 500 (Univ. of Cambridge and Eur. Corp.
Gov. Inst., Working Paper No. 124, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1396126.
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forth in its favor by all corporations.  Next, there is an identification
and analysis of some of the primary arguments directed against the
theory.  Finally, some concluding remarks are offered.
II. BACKGROUND
There are more than just shareholders who contribute to a cor-
poration, and there are others, in addition to shareholders, who are
affected by the actions of the corporation.  Scholars refer to persons
and groups who contribute to the corporation as stakeholders,11 con-
stituencies, contributors, or even investors.  As far as public corpora-
tions are concerned, it has been contended that a corporation’s affairs
are of such broad public concern and affect the lives and interests of so
many that a corporation can no longer be managed solely for the bene-
fit of shareholders.12
Several approaches may be classified as stakeholder in orienta-
tion.  Of particular note are the communitarian (or progressive) and
pluralist theories that have become popular in corporate law in the
past twenty years.  Reference to them will be made in places, but the
focus of this article is on what is termed “stakeholder theory.”  This
may imply there is only one form of the theory, but that is incorrect.  It
has actually been suggested that there is a genre of stakeholder theo-
ries, and not just one basic theory.13  This article intends to discuss the
main aspects of stakeholder theory with the caveat that it does not
purport to cover all possible views that may be influential in the devel-
opment of stakeholder theory.14  There are many variations of certain
points that may be seen as critical to the theory, and this has led to no
little confusion.  The following statement goes some way to explaining
the situation: “The result [of the literature in the field] is a baffling
exchange of stakeholder interpretations and aims that often have little
in common and serve to mystify rather than clarify the intellectual
terrain, rendering practical applications implausible if not impossi-
11 R. Edward Freeman & David L. Reed, Stockholders and Stakeholders: A New
Perspective on Corporate Governance, 25 CAL. MGMT. REV. 88, 89 (1983) (discuss-
ing how the term “stakeholder” can be traced back to a 1963 Stanford Research
Institute memorandum where it was used to refer to “those groups without whose
support the organization would cease to exist.”).
12 Robert S. Karmel, Implications of the Stakeholder Model, 61GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1156, 1171–75 (1993); Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Takeovers and
Corporate Law: Who’s in Control?, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1177, 1197–1207 (1993).
13 R. Edward Freeman, The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future Direc-
tions, 4 BUS. ETHICS Q. 409, 413 (1994).
14 See generally Morten Huse & Dorthe Eide, Stakeholder Management and the
Avoidance of Corporate Control, 35 BUS. & SOC’Y 211 (1996), for a discussion on
the different types of prevalent stakeholder theories.
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ble.”15  Those who would place themselves in the stakeholder theory
group vary in thinking, so what is considered here are only what can
be regarded as the views held by the majority of scholars and practi-
tioners of the theory.  The wide-ranging views that exist are consonant
with the fact that stakeholding is a broad concept.  The theory also
continues to evolve as scholars address old and new issues.  It should
be noted that the stakeholder theory is also known as the “stakeholder
model,” “stakeholder framework” or “stakeholder management.”16
Stakeholder theory, in broader social terms, has been invoked
by several theorists for a great number of years, and one can trace it
back to the work of the seventeenth century German social theorist,
Johannes Althusius,17 and incipient forms of stakeholder theory have
existed since the advent of industrialism.18  As one might expect, the
theory changed throughout corporate history.  Perhaps stakeholder
ideas as we know them today can be traced back to J. Maurice Clark in
an article from 1916,19 and it seems  the first writer to develop the
stakeholder idea in modern thought, but who did not use the term, was
Mary Parker Follett in 1918.20  It is possible to see the modern theory
in some embryonic form in the work of Professor E. Merrick Dodd in
the early 1930s.  A more advanced form of stakeholder theory (referred
to by one scholar as the “benign managerial model”21) was applied by
academics like Edward Mason22 and Carl Kaysen23 in the 1950s.  The
1950s edition of stakeholder theory was also practiced by many suc-
cessful American corporations (who made reference to their adoption
of a “stakeholder management” approach) in the period from the 1920s
15 Christopher Stoney & Diana Winstanley, Stakeholding: Confusion or Utopia?
Mapping the Conceptual Terrain, 38 J. MGMT. STUD. 603, 604 (2001).
16 R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 25
(1984).  Some regard the last descriptor to be outdated, see Jo¨rg Andriof et al.,
Introduction to UNFOLDING STAKEHOLDER THINKING 9 (J. Andriof, B. Hunter, S.
Waddock & S. Rahman eds., 2002), for a more recent account.
17 E. Orts, A North American Legal Perspective on Stakeholder Management The-
ory, in PERSPECTIVES ON COMPANY LAW 170 (F. MacMillan Patfield ed., 1997).
18 Thomas Clarke, The Stakeholder Corporation: A Business Philosophy for the
Information Age, 31 LONG RANGE PLAN. 182, 186 (1998).
19 J. Maurice Clark, The Changing Basis of Economic Responsibility, 24 J. POL.
ECON. 203 (1916).
20 JAMES E. POST ET AL., REDEFINING THE CORPORATION—STAKEHOLDER MANAGE-
MENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL WEALTH 18 (Stanford Business Books 2002).
21 John Parkinson, Models of the Company and the Employment Relationship, 41
BRIT J. INDUS. REL. 481, 493.
22 See generally Edward S. Mason, The Apologetics of “Managerialism”, 31 J. BUS.
1 (1958).
23 See generally Carl Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation,
47 AMER. ECON. REV. 311 (1957).
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to the 1950s.24  For instance, in the 1920s, Owen Young, President of
General Electric, acknowledged he had an obligation to the stockhold-
ers to pay a fair rate of return, but that he also had an obligation to the
laborers, customers, and the public.25  The chairman of the U.S. corpo-
ration, Standard Oil, stated, in 1946, that the business of corporations
should be carried on in such a way as to maintain “an equitable and
working balance among the claims of the various directly interested
groups—stockholders, employees, customers and the public at
large.”26  The development of the theory in its organised modern form
is usually traced to R. Edward Freeman and his influential book, Stra-
tegic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, published in 1984.27  In
the early 1980s, Freeman called for a rethinking of business organisa-
tions, arguing that the economic theories that had been preeminent in
the 1970s were outdated.28  Notwithstanding the fact that many years
have now passed since Freeman’s first articulation of a stakeholder
theory in relation to corporations, we have yet to see a robust and
workable theory formulated, something on which critics often focus.
III. WHAT IS STAKEHOLDER THEORY?
Stakeholder theory is a theory of organisational management
and ethics. The theory has been evolving as scholars address new as-
pects and confront alleged weaknesses.  It purports to provide an ac-
count of the purpose of the corporation.29  Before articulating the basic
theory we should note that there are three aspects of the theory: nor-
mative, descriptive, and instrumental.  The normative is an explana-
tion, on a moral basis, of how those who are able to be classified as
stakeholders should be treated, and it holds that stakeholders should
be seen as “ends” and not “means.”  Stakeholders are inherently valua-
ble to the corporation and should be treated as such in the manage-
ment of the affairs of the corporation.30  This is a legitimacy claim,
24 See Lee E. Preston & Harry J. Sapienza, Stakeholder Management and Corpo-
rate Performance, 19 J. BEHAV. ECON. 361, 362 (1990).  John Hendry, Missing the
Target: Normative Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate Governance Debate, 11
BUS. ETHICS. Q. 159, 160 (2001) (describing the 1930s through 1970s marked by
“industrial managerialism”).
25 E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1145, 1154 (1932).
26 MARGARET BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 212 (The Brookings Institute 1995).
27 See generally FREEMAN, supra note 16.
28 Thus, the theory was a response to the shareholder primacy theory. Id. at 52.
29 See Bruce Langtry, Stakeholders and the Moral Responsibilities of Business, 4
BUS. ETHICS Q. 431, 431 (1994).
30 Scott Reynolds et al., Stakeholder Theory and Managerial Decision-Making:
Constraints and Implications of Balancing Stakeholder Interests, 64 J. BUS. ETH-
ICS 285, 293 (2006).
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and, at its heart, is a clear disagreement with shareholder primacy,31
that managers should run corporations primarily for the shareholders
and to ensure that their wealth is maximised.32  The descriptive aspect
of stakeholder theory is that it is used to explain specific corporate
behavior.  The instrumental aspect provides a framework for examin-
ing the links between the practice of stakeholder management and a
corporation’s performance, and is concerned with looking at how
stakeholderism can improve a corporation’s efficiency and success.
There is a fourth aspect of the theory that is supported by some, and
that is the convergent approach.  It is a combination of the normative
and instrumental aspects.33
The core of the theory is normative,34  and this article focuses
on that aspect, but there is also discussion of some issues that are rele-
vant to the instrumental aspect.  This latter aspect tends to provide an
approach that is closer to the Anglo-American idea of private owner-
ship in corporate governance.  While it does not advocate moving away
from ownership rights, it does assert that emphasis should not be on
the sole ownership of the corporation by shareholders, as many share-
holder primacists do, because other stakeholders can claim ownership
rights.35  Perhaps the comment of Andrew Campbell that, “I support
stakeholder theory not from some left wing reason of equity, but be-
cause I believe it to be fundamental to understanding how to make
money in business”36 is somewhat indicative of some who would take
an instrumental approach.
Stakeholding notes that shareholders are merely one of many
competing and diverse groups that have an interest in the affairs of a
corporation.  A stakeholder approach, in general terms, is premised on
31 Bert Van de Ven, Human Rights as a Normative Basis for Stakeholder Legiti-
macy, 5 CORP. GOVERNANCE 48, 51 (2005).
32 There is much written on the theory. See generally D. Gordon Smith, The
Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998); Lynn Stout, Bad and Not-
So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002); Jill
Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy,
31 J. CORP. L. 637 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=878391 (last vis-
ited July 27, 2009); Andrew Keay, Shareholder Primacy in Corporate Law. Can it
Survive? Should it Survive?, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1498065.
33 Thomas Jones & Andrew Wicks, Convergent Stakeholder Theory, 24 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 206 (1999).
34 Thomas Donaldson & Lee Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation:
Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, ACAD. MGMT. REV., Jan. 1995, at 65, 74
(1995).
35 Steve Letza et al., Shareholding Versus Stakeholding: A Critical Review of Cor-
porate Governance, 12 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L. REV. 242, 251 (2004).
36 Andrew Campbell, Stakeholders, the Case in Favour, 30 LONG RANGE PLAN.
446, 446 (1997).
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the notion that an inclusive approach towards all contributors is—
from a social, economic and political perspective—valuable.  The the-
ory focuses on fostering the full potential of all contributors.  The ideal
in stakeholderism is that “all parties work together for a common goal
and obtain shared benefits, ‘opting in’ to the business’s project.”37  All
those who contribute critical resources to the corporation should bene-
fit. So, rather than the corporation working to create value for share-
holders, the stakeholder theory adheres to the idea that the
corporation works towards creation of value for all stakeholders.  Fur-
thermore, it is fundamental to stakeholding that organisations are
managed for the benefit of, and accountable to, all stakeholders.38
Stakeholding sees the purpose of the corporation as providing a vehicle
to serve in such a way as to coordinate the interests of stakeholders,39
and it is concerned about the damage that externalities can have on
participants in the corporate enterprise.40  Externalising is the prac-
tice of managers transferring the costs of the corporation to stakehold-
ers and retaining resulting benefits for shareholders.41  This occurs,
for example, where a corporation makes workers redundant so that
dividends can be paid to shareholders and the share price will
increase.42
Under stakeholder theory, the duty of managers of corpora-
tions is to create optimal value for all social actors who might be re-
garded as parties who can affect or are affected by a corporation’s
decisions.43  The argument is that those who are able to affect or be
affected by the corporation are stakeholders, and all stakeholders play
37 JANICE DEAN, DIRECTING PUBLIC COMPANIES, 94 (Cavendish 2001).
38 See generally WILL HUTTON, THE STATE WE’RE IN (Jonathan Cape 1995).
39 Chris Metcalfe, The Stakeholder Corporation, 7 BUS. ETHICS: EURO. REV. 30, 30
(1998) (quoting W. Evan & R. Edward Freeman, A Stakeholder Theory of the Mod-
ern Corporation, in ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS (Tom Beauchamp & Norman
Bowie eds., 1974)).
40 Principles of Stakeholder Management, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 257, 258 (2002).
41 It is argued by some shareholder primacy theorists that departing from share-
holder primacy to ensure no externalities exist would add to agency costs and re-
duce social wealth. See Ian Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About
Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 539 (2006).
42 A prime example of this is the decision of Shell in late 2009 to boost the dollar
value of the dividend by five per cent, notwithstanding a large decrease in profits.
This occurred only after the corporation had axed 5,000 jobs : Carl Mortished,
Shell to Axe 5,000 Jobs Amid 73% Profit Fall, THE TIMES, Oct. 29, 2009.
43 FREEMAN, supra note 16.  Some would restrict this more than Freeman.  For
instance, Professor Margaret Blair in the mid-1990s (she has subsequently em-
braced team production) limited those social actors who made specific investments
in the company (something that she continues to hold to under the Team Produc-
tion Approach). See generally Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, A Team Production
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).
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a vital role in the success of the corporate enterprise.  Stakeholders
have a right to be regarded as an end, and not a means to an end (i.e.
they are not used just to benefit the corporation in the long run, but
their benefits are an end for the corporation).44  As a consequence, it is
necessary for the managers to balance the interests of all stakeholders
when making decisions.45  The aim should be to make the corporation
a place where stakeholder interests can be maximised in due course.46
Stakeholder theory sees the role of directors as mediators,
where they mediate between the various stakeholders.47  This is re-
lated to the directors’ obligation to engage in balancing the interests of
stakeholders.  Balancing involves “assessing, weighing and addressing
the competing claims of those who have a stake in the actions of the
organization.”48  In undertaking balancing, it must be noted that while
all stakeholders might be regarded as equal, not all claims and inter-
ests of stakeholders are equal or relevant in a given situation.  The
facts will determine how one is to balance, and the outcome of manag-
ers’ decision-making and who gets what from corporation outputs is
based on a meritocracy, namely what did stakeholders contribute to
the enterprise.49  Managers should engage with stakeholders in mu-
tual respect and ascertain what they are saying, so that there is not
one-sided management.50
The people who have a stake generally include the corpora-
tion’s: customers, suppliers, financiers, creditors, shareholders, em-
ployees, and local communities, as well as local and national
governments (including tax authorities).  The rights of these groups
must be honored, and, further, the groups must participate, in some
sense, in decisions that substantially affect their welfare.51  Besides
the fact that all stakeholder interests must be taken into account, the
theory does not endorse any prioritisation of interests of stakeholders
in relation to one another.  Stakeholderism is “premised on the theory
44 FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 97.
45 Some might restrict it to “main” stakeholders. See, e.g., John Plender, Giving
People a Stake in the Future, 31 LONG RANGE PLAN. 211, 214 (1998).
46 R. Edward Freeman & Robert Phillips, Stakeholder Theory: A Libertarian De-
fense, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 331, 333 (2002).
47 Karmel, supra note 12, at 1157.
48 Scott Reynolds, et al., Stakeholder Theory and Managerial Decision-Making:
Constraints and Implications of Balancing Stakeholder Interests, 64 J. BUS. ETH-
ICS 285, 286 (2006).
49 Robert Phillips, Edward Freeman & Andrew Wicks, What Stakeholder Theory
Is Not, 13 BUS. ETHICS Q. 488 (2003).
50 Andriof, et al., supra note 16, at 9.
51 W. Evan & R. Edward Freeman, A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corpora-
tion: Kantian Capitalism, in ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS 103, 103 (Tom
Beauchamp & Norman Bowie eds., 1988).
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that groups in addition to shareholders have claims on a corporation’s
assets and earnings because those groups contribute to a corporation’s
capital.”52  Inequality among stakeholders would be acceptable only if
the action causing it improved the situation of the stakeholder most in
need.53  So, stakeholder theory rejects the idea of maximising a single
objective, as one gets with shareholder primacy where the focus is all
on maximising shareholder wealth.  As a normative thesis, stake-
holder theory holds to the legitimacy of the claims on the corporation
by many different groups and people.54  Managers are obliged to deal
transparently and honestly with all stakeholders,55 and ask: What will
stakeholders think about the decision we are contemplating?  They
then should consider which stakeholders warrant or require
consideration.56
The notion of “stakeholder” involves people or groups being
seen as having a stake in the corporation.  A stake “is an asserted or
real interest, claim or right, whether legal or moral, or an ownership
share in an undertaking.”57  It is where someone has something that is
at risk due to corporate action.58  The idea of “stakeholder” connotes
legitimacy, so it is legitimate for managers to spend time and re-
sources on such persons.59  William Evan and R. Edward Freeman
have sought to extend acknowledgement of who are stakeholders to
people and groups who have morally valid claims on the corporation,
as opposed to just economic claims, thus covering a wider spread than
those recognised by others.60  The critical thing is that the corporation
must “manage its relationships with its specific stakeholder groups in
an action-oriented way.”61  This involves directors being aware of the
52 Karmel, supra note 12, at 1171.
53 Freeman, supra note 13, at 415–416.
54 See Donaldson & Preston, supra note 34, at 66–67.  Freeman has said that it is
necessary for a company to identify those who are its stakeholders.  FREEMAN
supra note 16, at 54, 196.
55 Principles of Stakeholder Management, supra note 40, at 259.  How managers
should act is set out on page 260 of the article and the principles reproduce those
contained in THE CLARKSON CENTRE FOR BUSINESS ETHICS, PRINCIPLES OF STAKE-
HOLDER MANAGEMENT 60 (Univ. of Toronto, 1999).
56 Ronald Mitchell, et al., Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Sali-
ence: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts, 22 ACAD. OF MGMT.
REV. 853, 855 (1997).
57 Leo V. Ryan, The Evolution of Stakeholder Management: Challenges and Poten-
tial Conflicts, 3 INT.’L J. VALUE BASED MGMT. 105, 108 (1990).
58 Principles of Stakeholder Management, supra note 40, at 257–58.
59 FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 45.
60 Bruce Lantry, Stakeholders and the Moral Responsibilities of Business, 4 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 431, 432 (1994).
61 FREEMAN, supra note, 16 at 53.
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effect of their decisions on stakeholder groups, and then acting
accordingly.62
Identifying a corporation’s stakeholders is not a straightfor-
ward issue.  There are a number of approaches adopted for determin-
ing who are stakeholders, and there were twenty-eight different
definitions of “stakeholder” proposed between 1963 and 1995.63  A
leading advocate of stakeholder theory, Professor Max Clarkson,
adopted a narrow definition of stakeholders and regarded them as
those who “bear some form of risk as a result of having invested some
form of capital, human or financial, something of value, in a firm.”64
The approach has been endorsed by a substantial number of commen-
tators.65  Many commentators have distinguished between primary
(inside or internal) stakeholders, on the one hand, and secondary
(outside or external) stakeholders, on the other, with the former being
the focus of the theory.
Primary stakeholders are seen as those who have a formal, offi-
cial, or contractual relationship with the corporation, and without
whom the corporation could not function.  Many stakeholder theorists
have identified five primary stakeholders: financiers, customers, sup-
pliers, employees, and shareholders (some might also add communi-
ties).  These various stakeholders will have priority at different times.
There is a fair degree of interdependence between the corporation and
these stakeholders.
Secondary stakeholders are those who have not negotiated
with the corporation, but who can have influence and can affect the
corporation.  Their interests may, on occasion, require the corporation
to refrain from a particular course of action.66  Some deny that such
persons and groups are stakeholders as they are not involved, argua-
bly, in value exchanges.67  Others deny them standing as stakeholders
as they have no financial interest in the corporation.68  Often it is said
62 Id. at 196.
63 Mitchell, et al., supra note 56 at 853.
64 Max Clarkson, “A risk based model of stakeholder theory,” Proceedings of the
Second Toronto Conference on Stakeholder Theory, Centre for Corporate Social
Performance, University of Toronto, 1994 at 5, quoted in Amy Hillman and Gerald
D. Klein, Shareholder Value, Stakeholder Management and Social Issue.  What’s
the Bottom Line?, 22 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 125, 126 (2001).
65 See, e.g., Eric W. Orts & Alan Strudler, The Ethical and Environmental Limits
of Stakeholder Theory, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 215 (2002).
66 DEAN, supra note 37, at 99, 103.
67 See, e.g., Richard Lee Miller, Ethical Challenges in Corporate-Shareholder In-
vestor Relations: Using the Value Exchange Model to Analyze and Respond, 7 J.
BUS. ETHICS 117, 121 (1988).
68 Orts & Strudler, supra note 65, at 215.
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that there are six secondary stakeholders: governments, environmen-
talists, NGOs, critics, the media, and others.69
Archie Carroll divides stakeholders into three categories: those
who have ownership, those who have a right or claim on the corpora-
tion (and this could be legal or moral), and those who assert an inter-
est in the outcome of the corporation’s business.70  Some theorists
distinguish those who merely influence the corporation from those who
are truly stakeholders.71  In sum, most writers see the following as
stakeholders: employees, shareholders, suppliers, financial institu-
tions and lenders, general creditors, customers, the local community,
local and national governments, and the environment.  Of course, sev-
eral people might possess a number of overlapping interests and may
be both primary and secondary stakeholders or fall into more than one
group of primary or secondary stakeholders.  For instance, employees
might hold shares in their corporation, buy products from their corpo-
ration, and live in the community where the corporation’s factory/office
is located, thereby falling into several stakeholder groups.
Unlike shareholder primacy which focuses on efficiency, stake-
holder theory embraces a number of other values, whilst not rejecting
efficiency.  The value of trust is an important element in this theory.
It is argued that it is critical that the corporation secures the trust and
cooperation of its main stakeholder groups.72  The existence of trust
means that there is no need for elaborate contracts to be formulated.
As Dr. Janice Dean states, “The decision to trust, in business as else-
where centres on interpersonal expectations, the willingness to accept
temporary vulnerability and optimism about one’s partner’s beha-
viour.”73  Stakeholder theorists will argue that trust can lead to en-
hanced reputation.  It also means that if action contrary to a
stakeholder’s interests is contemplated, the managers need to explain
both the thinking behind the action and the consequences of it.  The
emphasis of the theory on values such as trust means that the involve-
ment of stakeholders cannot be priced.
It has been said that there should be a provision for rules in
corporations that insure the relations between stakeholders are gov-
erned by justice, and these rules must be endorsed by the stakehold-
ers.74  Some have even argued that there should be a board of directors
69 Yves Fassin, The Stakeholder Model Refined, 84 J. BUS. ETHICS 113, 115 (2009).
70 ARCHIE B. CARROL, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY: ETHICS AND STAKEHOLDER MANAGE-
MENT 56–57 (South-Western 1989).
71 Donaldson & Preston, supra note 34, at 86.
72 CHARLES HANDY, THE HUNGRY SPIRIT 181 (Broadway Books 1997).
73 DEAN, supra note 37, at 107.
74 Norman E. Bowie, A Kantian Theory of Capitalism, 8 BUS. ETHICS Q. 37, 47
(1998).
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that is representative of the stakeholders in a corporation,75 so stake-
holders, in addition to shareholders, should have the opportunity to
vote for the directors.  Professor Kent Greenfield asserts that the best
way for a board to engage in decision-making is to have all important
stakeholders represented on it.  Greenfield acknowledges that this
mechanism presents difficulties but argues that employees, the com-
munities in which the corporation employs a significant portion of its
workers, long-term business partners, and creditors could all be repre-
sented.76  We shall return to this issue later.
Directors in a stakeholding system are perceived as trustees of
the stakeholders’ interests.  They are to have a focus on the long-term
future of the corporation, and act as stewards of all that they man-
age.77  As directors, they are to be trusted and relied on as profession-
als.  Nevertheless, accountability measures should be put in place, but
unlike with shareholder primacy, there is no presumption that the di-
rectors will act opportunistically or shirk.
In an attempt to have the theory taken seriously, Dean has
suggested the following as an appropriate legislative provision that al-
lows for stakeholding:
A director of a public limited company shall in all his/her
conduct and decision making so act as to advance the de-
velopment of the company in the interests of its custom-
ers, its employees and its shareholders and with proper
regard for the effect of its operations on the environment
and on the community.  The interests to which a director
of a public company should give due consideration
include:
The provision for customers of safe and effective goods
and services of good quality at fair prices;
The provision for employees of fair remuneration and se-
cure work with reasonable opportunity for their interests
to be heard within the company and for their promotion
and development of skills;
The provision for shareholders of fair returns to remu-
nerate past investment and encourage future investment
in the company;
75 See, e.g., Kent Greenfield & D. Gordon Smith, Debate: Saving the World With
Corporate Law?, 57 EMORY L.J. 947, 978 (2008); Frederick R. Post, A Response to
“The Social Responsibility of Corporate Management: A Classical Critique,” 18
MID-AMERICAN J. BUS. 25, 32 (2003).
76 Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age, 2 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 1, 24 (2008).
77 Plender, supra note 45, at 215.
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The provision for key business associates including sup-
pliers of goods and services of secure relationships and
ongoing co-operation where such connections offer ad-
vantages to both parties;
The provision for the community of programmes to moni-
tor and minimise the environmental impact of the com-
pany’s operations and advance responsible conduct
towards the company’s neighbours.78
Unlike shareholder value and communitarianism, both of
which separate economics and ethics, stakeholder theory embraces
both, with the theory being used as a basis for translating business
ethics to management practice and strategy.79  The separation pro-
vided for under shareholder primacy, with its focus on a single objec-
tive, means that shareholder value provides a narrow approach that, it
is asserted, cannot “do justice to the panoply of human activity that is
value creation and trade, i.e., business.”80  Stakeholder theory seeks to
remedy that situation by being far broader.
The relationship between economics and ethics has always
been ambiguous,81 and stakeholder theory seeks to bring the two to-
gether.82  Some stakeholder theorists even embrace a form of agency
theory, with stakeholders being regarded as principals.83  Also, while
the nexus of contracts metaphor84 for the corporation is often associ-
ated with the shareholder primacy theory, some of those holding to
78 DEAN, supra note 37, at 138.
79 Fassin, supra note 69, at 113.
80 R. Edward Freeman et al., Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate Objective Re-
visited, 15 ORG. SCI. 364, 364 (2004).
81 John Hendry, Missing the Target: Normative Stakeholder Theory and the Cor-
porate Governance Debate  11 BUS. ETHICS Q. 159, 161 (2001).
82 Interestingly, Elaine Sternberg, a shareholder primacy supporter also purports
to bring them together. ELAINE STERNBERG, JUST BUSINESS (Little, Brown & Co.,
2d ed. 2000).
83 Charles W. Hill & Thomas M. Jones, Stakeholder-Agency Theory, 19  J. MGMT.
STUD. 131 (1992).
84 This is a theory that provides that the company is to be seen as nothing more
than a number of complex, private consensual transactions or contract-based rela-
tions, either express or implied, and they consist of many different kinds of rela-
tions that are worked out by those voluntarily associating in a company. Frank
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract,  89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1426 (1989).  The literature considering the nexus of contracts is too volumi-
nous to cite. See generally Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Infor-
mation Costs and Economic Organizations, 62 AMERICAN ECON. REV. 777 (1972);
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Beha-
viour, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure,  3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Eugene
F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm,  88 J. POL. ECON. 228 at 290
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stakeholder theory accept such a metaphor on the basis that all corpo-
rate constituents are part of the nexus and all are on an equal foot-
ing.85  This is contrasted with the traditional articulation of nexus of
contracts theory which does not see some who are generally thought of
as stakeholders in most corporations, such as suppliers and customers,
as actually part of the corporation.86  Under stakeholder theory, corpo-
rations should be prepared to make disclosures to stakeholders where
appropriate, and stakeholders should be encouraged by the corpora-
tion to be involved in the life of the corporation.87  There is often an
emphasis on the relationship between stakeholders and the corpora-
tion (represented by the managers).  Theorists also emphasise that
stakeholders interact with one another.  This fosters the idea of inter-
dependence that is a primary feature of stakeholder theory.
Stakeholder theory desires that stakeholders have a voice in
the decision-making process in corporations, as well as an interest in
the results of that process.88  Consequently, some theorists have ar-
gued for institutional representation—places on the board of directors
for the various stakeholders—something which has been high on the
pluralist theory’s agenda.89  This is possible as Denmark, Sweden, and
Luxembourg all have employee representatives on one-tier boards of
directors.90  While few theorists come to terms with how they see the
nature of the corporation because they are more concerned with what
the corporation does, it might be said that many would agree that a
corporation is “a public association constituted through political and
legal processes and as a social entity for the pursuing of collective
goals with public obligations.”91
(1980); William W. Bratton Jr, The ‘Nexus of Contracts Corporation’: A Critical
Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989).
85 See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus
of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 833 (1999).
86 Luigi Zingales, In Search of New Foundations, 55 J. FIN. 1623, 1634 (2000).
87 DEAN, supra note 37, at 101.
88 FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 196; see generally Phillips, Freeman & Wicks, supra
note 49.
89 See generally Evan & Freeman, supra note 51.  For a brief critique of this, see
Andrew Keay, The Ultimate Objective of the Public Company and the Enforcement
of the Entity Maximisation and Sustainability Model, (on file with author), availa-
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1481250.
90 Franklin  Allen, Elena Carletti,  & Robert Marquez, Stakeholder Capitalism,
Corporate Governance and Firm Value, 6 (Wharton Financial Institutions Center,
Working Paper No. 09-28, 2007), available at  http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.
edu/papers/1344.pdf.
91 Silvia Ayuso et al., Maximising Stakeholders’ Interests: An Empirical Analysis
of the Stakeholder Approach to Corporate Governance, 3 (IESE Business School,
Univ. of Navarra Working Paper No. 670, 2007).
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Finally, stakeholder theory appeals to many people because,
inter alia, it has been said to be a matter of “taming” the “harsher
aspects of capitalism.”92  The theory asserts that there is more to busi-
ness than just making money, and it seeks to ensure that the vision of
managers is broadened.93  In her study of the documents of Fortune
100 corporations in the United States, Professor Lisa Fairfax found
that all but the documents and communications of two corporations
included stakeholder rhetoric.94  Additionally, it might be concluded
from this that corporations engage in stakeholder rhetoric to offset the
negative feelings that come from the pursuit of the maximisation of
shareholder wealth, especially in difficult financial times.  Stakeholder
theory has portrayed the image of being able to right the wrongs
caused by the perceived worst excesses of shareholder primacy in the
management of corporations such as Enron.95  It has become “the vo-
cabulary and methodology for doing this because it is seen as being
capable of satisfaction by the construction of a passive notion of social
responsibility.”96
IV. THE RATIONALE FOR, AND ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF,
THE THEORY
Some take the view that shareholder primacy damages the in-
terests of non-shareholding stakeholders, and this forms the basis for
a legitimate claim that these stakeholders warrant consideration and
protection in the management of a corporation’s affairs.97  Others pro-
vide different rationales for stakeholding.  One of the classic state-
ments is made by R. Edward Freeman and his co-authors when they
express the rationale behind the theory in this way:
Business is about putting together a deal so that suppli-
ers, customers, employees, communities, managers and
shareholders all win continuously over time.  In short, at
some level, stakeholder interests have to be joint—they
must be traveling in the same direction—or else there
will be exit, and a new collaboration formed.98
92 J. Plender, The Stakeholding Solution, London, Nicholas Brealey, 1997 cited in
J. Dean, Directing Public Companies, (London, Cavendish, 2001) at 117.
93 Orts & Strudler, supra note 65, at 216.
94 Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder
Rhetoric on Corporate Norms, 21 J. CORP. L. 675, 677–678, 713–715 (2005).
95 See generally Jones & Wicks, supra note 33.
96 Sally Wheeler, Works Councils: Towards Stakeholding?, 24 J.L. & SOC’Y 44, 49
(1997).
97 David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law : Foundations and Law Re-
form Strategies,  in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 3  (Lawrence Mitchell ed., 1995).
98 Freeman et al., supra note 80, at 365.
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There are two points here.  First, a corporation needs a number
of contributors to ensure that it thrives and survives.  If directors do
not consider other stakeholders then these people and groups will have
no commitment to the corporation and this might lead to withdrawal
of their investment or their unwillingness to support the corporation
when it is in need.  All of this could affect the performance and wealth
of the corporation, thereby failing to enhance social wealth.
The second point is that it is best for everyone if the corpora-
tion functions so that stakeholders obtain as much value as possible.99
Shareholder value advocates make a similar argument, but get there
via a different route.  The stakeholder theory school argues that it is
more reasonable and beneficial to take into account all stakeholders
rather than pursue shareholder primacy.  For a corporation to thrive it
must, inter alia, produce competitive returns for shareholders, satisfy
customers in order to produce profits, recruit and motivate excellent
employees, and build successful relationships with suppliers.100
Stakeholding is the instrument through which efficiency, profitability,
competition, and economic success can be promoted on the basis that if
one removed cohesion among stakeholders it would not be possible for
corporations to be competitive.101  The huge mining corporation, BHP
Billiton, has effectively acknowledged this, and states that it seeks a
competitive advantage by exploring new ways of approaching and en-
gaging in relationships with its key stakeholders.102
The theory provides that if the interests of stakeholders are ca-
tered for, and such stakeholders are shown loyalty; then the share-
holders will benefit more than if shareholder wealth maximisation
were practised, because the corporation would benefit and it would
also produce greater social wealth.103  However, many shareholder pri-
macy theorists argue that shareholders’ interests have to be the first
priority or the corporation will not prosper.  The fact of the matter is
that it is probably a matter of the degree to which stakeholder inter-
ests are taken into account, and what happens when there is a conflict
between shareholder interests and the interests of other stakeholders
that really matters.  Shareholder primacy scholars would say that the
former are automatically to be preferred, while stakeholder theory
99 Id.
100 DEAN, supra note 37, at 251.
101 Andrew Campbell, Stakeholders: The Case in Favour, 30 LONG RANGE PLAN.
446 (1997).
102 BHP Billiton, Submission 13, p. 1 to the Australian Joint Parliamentary Com-
mittee on Corporations and Financial Services and referred to at para 3.18 of the
report (Corporate Responsibility: Managing Risk and Creating Value, June 2006
at para 4.46 available at http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/corporations_
ctte/completed_inquiries/2004-07/corporate_responsibility/report/index.htm.
103 Greenfield & Smith, supra note 75, at 975.
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would say that it depends on balancing a number of factors and the
interests of stakeholders.  Dean states that “[i]f the board had to con-
sider the interests of all relevant stakeholders and the standards ex-
pected of directors were more clearly defined in law, the position would
become simpler overall.”104  The reason for this is that considering a
broad range of stakeholders will enhance the corporation’s reputation
and lead others to feel that the corporation is principled and can be
trusted.  Dean asserts that this would benefit everyone involved.105  If
stakeholders’ interests are taken into account by managers in running
the corporation, and stakeholders are going to be rewarded, it is likely
that they will be more ready to “go the extra mile” in their dealings
with the corporation.106  Employees might devote more time and care
to their labor, suppliers might be ready to deliver smaller quantities of
goods when doing so might be of marginal economic benefit to them,
and customers will remain loyal through difficult times.
Besides relying on the need to keep stakeholders involved in
corporations, Freeman and Philips have argued for the theory on the
basis that stakeholders deserve protection as they have property
rights in the corporation to which they have contributed.107  For in-
stance, suppliers have a property interest in what they supply to the
corporation.108  The idea is that stakeholder groups have a claim on
the corporation’s property and profits as they contributed to the capi-
tal of the corporation.109  Like shareholders, they have risked their in-
vestment in the corporation.  Stakeholders make firm, specific
investments in the corporation.  For instance, employees may make an
investment in corporations by way of undergoing specialised training
that might not be able to be used elsewhere in other employment.
Suppliers might acquire specialised machinery to enable them to sup-
ply the corporation with particular kinds of products, even if this ma-
chinery could not be used on any other current or future contract.
Leaving aside any notion of property rights, stakeholders war-
rant protection on other grounds.  Shareholder primacists argue that
non-shareholder constituencies are protected by contract, but the ri-
poste is that most stakeholders are unable to negotiate on an even
footing as there is inequality of bargaining power.  So, a normative
foundation for providing protection for stakeholders is that it makes
sure that the legitimate expectations of such people, and those are
104 DEAN, supra note 37, at 108
105 Id. at 108.
106 Plender, supra note 45, at 215.
107 Freeman & Philips, supra note 46, at 338.
108 Id.
109 Karmel, supra note 12, at 1171.
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above and beyond the terms of any contract, are fulfilled.110  When
stakeholders get involved with a corporation this elicits an implied
promise from the corporation that the directors will consider the inter-
ests of the stakeholders.  This is a form of social contract approach to
the issue.
From an efficiency viewpoint managers do not generally have a
personal association or ties with shareholders, yet they do with many
stakeholders.111  Managers regularly deal with: employees, regarding
work performance and working conditions; suppliers, concerning the
quality of the goods delivered and non-delivery of goods; customers,
who complain about the goods that the corporation markets; and local
communities, concerning what the corporation is doing or not doing as
a corporate citizen.  If managers practice stakeholder theory, they can
take into account stakeholder concerns, and, in many cases, demon-
strate that they are considering the interests of the stakeholders.  Con-
sequently, managers gain respect and trust in the eyes of
stakeholders; and, importantly for the corporation, they can do their
job better and more efficiently.
Running a modern corporation leads to interdependencies in-
volving many groups for whom the corporation should have a legiti-
mate concern.112  If the reasonable expectations of such groups are not
met, then the long-term profitability of the corporation will suffer and
stakeholder theory is concerned about the long-term.  Taking into ac-
count all stakeholders’ interests recognises the interdependence of
parties involved in corporations and is likely to pre-empt selfish com-
petition among constituents.113  Where conflict between stakeholders
cannot be avoided, managers are to embrace actions that will at least
compensate stakeholders for any loss suffered.114
It has been noted that the stakeholder theory rejects the idea of
maximising a single objective.  As a normative thesis, the theory holds
to the legitimacy of the claims on the corporation that many different
groups and people have, and this justifies its implementation.115
“[T]he economic and social purpose of the corporation is to create and
distribute wealth and value to all its primary stakeholder groups with-
110 Wai Shun Wilson Leung, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: A Proposed
Corporate Regime that Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests, 30 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 589, 622 (1997).
111 E. Merrick Dodd Jr., Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corpo-
rate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 194, 202–03 (1935).
112 Karmel, supra note 12, at 1169.
113 See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 641–43.
114 Millon, supra note 97, at 12.
115 See Donaldson & Preston, supra note 34, at 66–67.
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out favoring one group at the expense of others.”116  Unlike share-
holder primacy, no grouping has prima facie priority over another,117
and no group warrants priority over any other groups.118  Donaldson
and Preston have said, that “each group of stakeholders merits consid-
eration for its own sake and not merely because of its ability to further
the interests of some group, such as shareowners.”119  In shareholder
primacy, stakeholders are treated as a means, whereas the stake-
holder theory holds that stakeholders should be treated as ends.  The
adherents to this latter theory have advocated concepts of individual
autonomy and fairness to all members of society.120  The theory posits
the equality of all stakeholders in that they all have intrinsic value
and all are morally entitled to be considered in the management of the
corporation’s affairs, and to be considered simultaneously,121 even if
this does not advance the interests of shareholders.122  The rights of
these groups must be assured, and further, the groups must partici-
pate in decisions that substantially affect their welfare.123  The moral
basis is that a duty is imposed on all organisations in relation to all
individuals who are involved with them.  Failure to do so would be a
breach of human rights irrespective of who was the stakeholder
prejudiced.124
This ties in with the arguments of the communitarian (or pro-
gressive) school, which asserts that stakeholders who are not share-
holders are entitled to be shown consideration because they are owed
more than what they have bargained for.  Those involved in a corpora-
tion owe each other respect and support.125  As mentioned earlier,
stakeholder theory emphasizes trust, and a number of stakeholders
have to rely on trust and virtually nothing else.  The advantage of
trustworthiness for the corporation is that it might enhance its reputa-
tion.  Trust between corporations and their stakeholders can arguably
116 Max B.E. Clarkson, A Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating
Corporate Social Performance, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 92, 112 (1995).
117 See Donaldson & Preston, supra note 34, at 68.
118 Mohammed Omran et al., Shareholders Versus Stakeholders: Corporate Mis-
sion Statements and Investor Returns, 11 BUS. ETHICS: EURO. REV. 318, 318 (2002).
119 Donaldson & Preston, supra note 34, at 67.
120 See generally John R. Boatright, Fiduciary Duties and the Shareholder-Man-
agement Relation: Or, What’s So Special About Shareholders?, 4 BUS. ETHICS Q.
393 (1994).
121 Mitchell et al., supra note 56, at 862.
122 Richard Marens & Andrew Wicks, Getting Real: Stakeholder Theory, Manage-
rial Practice and the General Irrelevance of Fiduciary Duties Owed to Sharehold-
ers, 9 BUS. ETHICS Q. 273, 274 (1999).
123 Evan & Freeman, supra note 51, at 103.
124 Phillips, Freeman & Wicks, supra note 49, at 494.
125 Millon, supra note 97, at 4.
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reduce costs, as stakeholders seldom have to monitor the managers;
they can trust the managers to do their job properly.
The theory posits that many stakeholders—who cannot obtain
protection for reasons such as lack of bargaining power, ignorance, or
insufficient funds to pay necessary costs (e.g. legal costs)—must rely
on fair treatment.  In actuality, contractual arrangements between
equals occurs infrequently.  Many contracts assume a “take it or leave
it” approach with the result that costs are imposed on third parties
with whom the corporation does business.126  Several scholars have re-
ported that contracts involving stakeholders are “neither complete nor
perfectly priced.”127
The theory may reflect the fact that the world has become more
complex, and, as a result, the affairs and decisions of corporations af-
fect or are affected by an increasing number of people and groups.  For
example, until recently, environmental issues have not been regularly
or widely seen as causing major concern to corporations.  Stakeholder
theorists often argue that their theory takes into account the complex-
ity of the world, whereas shareholder primacy is far too glib.
Undoubtedly, this model has a lot of attraction.  It emphasizes
endearing values like trust and fairness.  The model also embraces
both economics and ethics, elements which have been difficult to bal-
ance.  The focus on stakeholders has, as we have noted, several advan-
tages; however, a number of concerns have been raised in relation to
the theory, which we now turn to examine.
V. CONCERNS WITH, AND ARGUMENTS AGAINST, THE
THEORY
Some leading scholars have boldly proclaimed that the preemi-
nence of stakeholder theory has extinguished shareholder primacy.128
While the stakeholder theory has spread rapidly in both influence and
application,129 criticism of the theory endures.  In general terms the
theory has been described as, “naive, superficial and unrealis-
tic. . . .”130  One trenchant critic has said that the theory is “deeply
dangerous and wholly unjustified”131 on the basis that it undercuts
126 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of
Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1156 (1982).
127 Fisch, supra note 32, at 659.
128 See Freeman, supra note 13, at 413.
129 Paddy Ireland, Corporate Governance, Stakeholding, and the Company: To-
wards a Less Degenerate Capitalism?, 23 J.L. & SOC’Y 287, 296 (1996).
130 Christopher Stoney & Diana Winstanley, Stakeholding: Confusion or Utopia?
Mapping the Conceptual Terrain, 38 J. MGMT. STUD. 600, 606 (2001).
131 Elaine Sternberg, The Defects of Stakeholder Theory, 5 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN
INT’L REV. 3, 8 (1997).
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private property, denies agents’ duties to principals, and destroys
wealth.132  It has even been said that it lacks the status of a theory
and is instead merely a research tradition or framework.133  As such,
the literature dealing with stakeholder theory has tended to focus on
justifying the approach rather than developing a systematic theory.134
This part of the article seeks to identify and examine the con-
cerns that have been expressed about the stakeholder theory, as well
as analyzing the primary arguments that critics have raised.  A num-
ber of the concerns considered and arguments put forward against the
theory overlap but are separately categorized for purposes of exposi-
tion and clarity.
A. Lack of Solid Normative Foundations
The point has been made that stakeholder theory has failed to
provide any normative foundations for its justification.135  In particu-
lar, it fails to provide a normative base on which to ascertain who can
be a stakeholder and what weight ought to be given to each stake-
holder.136  Consequently, there is no basis for a manager, in running
the corporation, to prefer stakeholderism to other moral approaches.
Freeman has asserted that no normative foundational justification is
necessary, but does offer one, as explained below.137
Many arguments in favor of the theory are grounded in eco-
nomics, but stakeholding does have a moral basis in that it provides
for how agents should treat each other.  However, various apologists
for the theory have differed in their explanations of the theory’s philo-
sophical bases.  Some theorists have sought to build a foundation us-
132 Id. at 9.
133 Linda Klebe Trevin˜o & Gary R. Weaver, The Stakeholder Research Tradition:
Converging Theorists–Not Convergent Theory, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 222, 224
(1999).
134 See generally Simon Learmount, Theorizing Corporate Governance: New Orga-
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bridge Working Paper No. 237, available at http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/
WP237.pdf (last visited March 31, 2010).
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Univ. P, 1989); see Antonio Argandon˜a, The Stakeholder Theory and the Common
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alogue: Toward Superior Stakeholder Theory, 18 BUS. ETHICS Q. 153, 162, 163
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ing the principle of fairness,138 which entitles those who provide
resources to the corporation to a return on their contributions.139  As
Robert Phillips explained:
Whenever persons or groups of persons voluntarily ac-
cept the benefits of a mutually beneficial scheme of co-
operation requiring sacrifice or contribution on the parts
of the participants and there exists the possibility of free-
riding, obligations of fairness are created among the par-
ticipants in the co-operative scheme in proportion to the
benefits accepted.140
Phillips argues that the concept of cooperative schemes encom-
passes commercial transactions and that consent is not necessary for a
person to be regarded as a stakeholder.141  He suggests that the fair-
ness principle is able to reconceptualize business relations as coopera-
tive rather than adversarial.142  This approach, he argues, is likely to
enable a resolution to a conflict situation between stakeholders.
Other scholars rely on different moral bases for the theory.  For
example, Evan and Freeman propose a deontological or duty founda-
tion (rooted in Kantian philosophical foundations, with some reliance
on social contract theory)143 which provides that persons should re-
spect others as equals.144  As a corollary, all people and groups have
intrinsic value and are to be regarded not as means to ends, but as
ends themselves.145  Hence, corporations should not be seen simply as
profit producers for shareholders.  A criticism of this view is that while
the Kantian approach provides that humans are, as rational, moral
agents, to be regarded as ends in themselves, the stakeholder theory
also identifies non-persons, such as the environment and the commu-
nity, as stakeholders, and is therefore inappropriate.146
Another moral basis suggests that distributive justice entitles
stakeholders to a share of corporate earnings as they contributed to
the creation of the earnings and had legitimate expectations that they
138 See generally FREEMAN, supra note 16.
139 Metcalfe, supra note 39, at 32.
140 FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 57.
141 Id. at 59.
142 Id. at 64.
143 IMMANUEL KANT, THE MORAL LAW OR KANT’S GROUNDWORK OF THE META-
PHYSIC OF MORALS 95  (H. J. Paton trans.,  1956) (“[E]very rational being . . . must
in all his actions, whether they are directed to himself or to other rational beings,
always be viewed at the same time as an end.”).
144 See generally, Evan & Freeman, supra note 51.
145 Kevin Gibson, The Moral Basis of Stakeholder Theory, 26 J. BUS. ETHICS 245,
248 (2000). See Donaldson & Preston, supra note 34, at 67.
146 Sternberg, supra note 131, at 6.
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would share in the corporation’s success.  Antonio Argandon˜a argues
that the theory can be based on the concept of the common good.147
The common good involves establishing the conditions that enable
those linked with a corporation to achieve their personal goals.148
While they do not develop it, Thomas Donaldson and Lee Preston sug-
gest the theory is built upon property rights, and posit the idea that
stakeholder rights can compete with those of shareholders.149  Yet an-
other basis given is that failure by managers to consider stakeholders
would be a breach of the latter’s human rights.150  In fairness, many
corporate law theories have various bases.  But this concern is the
least of stakeholder theory’s problems.
B. Lack of Clarity
One of the major criticisms of stakeholder theory is that its un-
derlying concepts lack clarity.151  Even zealous stakeholder theorists
have admitted the theory suffers from vagueness, ambiguity, and
breadth.152  James Humber views the theory as a collage of elements
that are at odds with one another, thereby producing no systematic
coherence.153 Goyder compares adopting stakeholderism in lieu of
shareholder primacy to sacrificing clarity for blancmange, presumably
because blancmange is difficult to get a hold of.154  One of the theory’s
major problems is that it is not always clearly articulated.  It has been
said that stakeholding is “a slippery creature . . . used by different
people to mean widely different things which happen to suit their
arguments.”155
Another reason that is given is that “most work in this field
appears to be preoccupied with justifying a stakeholder approach to
the firm, rather than the construction of  systematic theory to describe
more adequately contemporary organizational practices.”156  Further
confusion might come from the fact that the theory provides that it is
147 Antonio Argandon˜a, supra note 135, at 1093.
148 Id. at 1097.
149 Donaldson & Preston, supra note 34, at 83.
150 B. Van de Ven, Human Rights as a Normative Basis for Stakeholder Legiti-
macy, 5 CORP. GOVERNANCE 48 (2005).
151 See Christopher Stoney & Diana Winstanley, Stakeholding: Confusion or Uto-
pia? Mapping the Conceptual Terrain, 38 J. MGMT. STUD., 603, 605–06; (2001);
Le´pineux, supra note 135, at 100.
152 Phillips, Feeman, & Wicks, supra note 49, at 479–80.
153 James M. Humber, Beyond Stockholders and Stakeholders: A Plea for Moral
Autonomy, 36 J. BUS. ETHICS 207, 215 (2002).
154 MARK GOYDER, LIVING TOMORROW’S COMPANY 3 (Gower, 1998).
155 Martin Vander Weyer, In an Ideal World, MANAGEMENT TODAY, Sept. 1996, at
35.
156 See generally Learmount, supra note 134.
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morally correct for corporations to be managed for stakeholders, and
that means that it is inconsistent with the relativism of the theory.157
We now turn to specific issues with stakeholder theory.  First
and foremost, stakeholder theory has been a difficult concept to de-
fine.158  One of the main difficulties for the theory, in this respect, and
acknowledged by stakeholder theorists,159 has been in identifying and
defining who are, in fact, stakeholders.160  Defining stakeholders is
crucial as it is the first critical step in applying the theory.161  Not-
withstanding the volume of the literature in the field, the concept of
stakeholder is seen as vague and blurred.162  The concept is probably
much more indefinite today than in the early days of modern
stakeholderism, because more and more scholars have attempted to
devise a definition.  Definitions have varied from the narrow to the
very broad.  It is easier to broaden the concept, but when that is done
the theory becomes more and more meaningless, and, therefore, ac-
cording to some, useless.163  Professors Simon Deakin and Alan
Hughes have said that if the theory is so wide as to embrace interests
of a broader range of people and groups, such as potential consumers
and the interests of society, then the theory risks being regarded as
irrelevant.164
Our discussion about who stakeholders are starts from the ad-
mission that “there is no easy way to delineate the stakeholder
class.”165  Probably the first articulation of the concept was provided in
an internal memorandum at the Stanford Research Institute in
1963,166 which said that stakeholders were “those groups without
whose support the organization would cease to exist.”167  This tended
to be narrow and the groups covered by the term were said to be share-
holders, employees, customers, suppliers, lenders, and society.168
Freeman built on this, and in 1984, he opined that the term “stake-
157 Humber, supra note 153, at 215.
158 M. Omran, et al., Shareholders Versus Stakeholders: Corporate Mission State-
ments and Investor Returns, 11 BUS. ETHICS: EUR. REV. 318, 318 (2002).
159 See R. Phillips, Stakeholder Legitimacy, 13 BUS. ETHICS Q. 25, 25 (2003).
160 Mitchell, et al., supra note 56, at 858 (identifying 27 definitions for stakehold-
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161 Fassin, supra note 69, at 125.
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holder” should denote those who make a difference, and defined stake-
holders as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the
achievement of the organization’s objectives.”169  This broadens the
category of stakeholders to include governments, customers, environ-
mental groups, etc.  The criticism often voiced is that managers are
given no basis or method for identifying who are stakeholders.170  Fur-
thermore, some stakeholders are more important than others, but
there is no guidance to determine who are the more important stake-
holders.171  There are a huge number of potential stakeholders, and
the problem is determining how to address the needs of divergent
groups.172
The stakeholder case has probably been harmed by the fact
that Freeman included terrorist groups as stakeholders in some corpo-
rations (on the basis that they can affect how corporations are run).173
Many have sought to distance the theory from this approach.  Some
commentators have said that one must distinguish between those who
influence the corporation and those who are true stakeholders.174
Some investors are in both categories, while some, such as the media,
are in the first category only.175  Other commentators distinguish be-
tween primary or inside stakeholders, on the one hand, and secondary
or outside stakeholders, on the other, with the former being the focus
of attention.176  Primary stakeholders are seen as those who have a
formal, official or contractual relationship with the corporation.177
Professor John Parkinson said that stakeholders included those who
entered a long-term relationship with the corporation and held legiti-
mate expectations of mutual gain from the continuing relationship.178
Several commentators have introduced other ways of defining
and differentiating stakeholders.  Robert Phillips referred to norma-
tive, derivative, and dormant stakeholders.179 Normative stakeholders
are those to whom the corporation owes a moral obligation, while de-
rivative stakeholders are ones who can either damage or benefit the
169 Id. at 246.
170 Humber, supra note 153, at 211.
171 Anant K. Sundaram, & Andrew C. Inkpen, The Corporate Objective Revisited,
15 ORG. SCI. 350, 352 (2004).
172 Leung, supra note 110, at 621.
173 FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 53.
174 Donaldson & Preston, supra note 34, at 86.
175 Id.
176 Fassin, supra note 69, at 129.
177 ARCHIE CARROLL, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY 62 (1993).
178 John Parkinson, Company Law and Stakeholder Governance, in STAKEHOLDER
CAPITALISM 149–150 (Gavin Kelly et al. eds., 1997).
179 See generally Phillips, supra note 159.
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corporation, and no moral obligation is owed to them.180  Dormant
stakeholders are groups such as terrorists who may never affect the
corporation, but can do so at some indeterminate point in the life of the
corporation.181
The main distinction, as far as stakeholders are concerned, is
between those without whom the corporation cannot function and
those who can affect or be affected by the corporation, with the latter
being the classical and managerial approach, and the former as more
of a legal view.182  The latter approach is far broader, and, given the
way that trade has developed, could encompass just about anyone.183
Technically, it is not just actors who have contact with the corporation
that could be included under this approach.  Parties who deal with
those who contract with the corporation also could be said to be stake-
holders.184  For example, a corporation, X, supplies bolts to Y corpora-
tion.  Y supplies engine parts to carmaker, Z corporation.  X could be
regarded as a stakeholder in Z, even though there is no direct contact
between the two corporations.  Certainly, if Y lost its business with Z,
it is likely that X would be affected significantly.  Stakeholders of a
corporation have their own subset of stakeholders, so the net grows
ever wider.185  In recent research, Yves Fassin found in excess of 100
stakeholders groups and sub-groups identified in the literature.186  Dr.
Elaine Sternberg has said that:
[G]iven the increasing internationalisation of modern life
and the global connections made possible by improved
transportation, telecommunications and computing
power, those affected (at least distantly or indirectly) by
any given organisation, and thus counting as its stake-
holders includes virtually everyone, everything,
everywhere.187
Whilst she might be using hyperbole, the general point has
merit.  For instance, taking the illustration above, Z will be at the end
of a chain of trading arrangements, and all of the businesses in the
chain could be regarded as stakeholders of the large corporation that
might be at the end of the chain.  This means that a large corporation
180 Id.
181 Id. at 31.
182 Fassin, supra note 69, at 117.
183 Metcalfe, supra note 39.
184 Fassin, supra note 69, at 119.
185 Phillips, supra note 159, at 34.
186 Fassin, supra note 69, at 120.
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like Z might have thousands of stakeholders who are indirectly (per-
haps very indirectly) affected by its actions.
Andrew Campbell, a stakeholder theorist, has effectively said
that one cannot identify stakeholders in the abstract; it will depend on
the corporation’s purpose.188  The commentator has noted that most
corporations will have four active stakeholders, namely: shareholders,
employees, suppliers, and customers.189  These clearly fit within the
primary category mentioned earlier.  They are also clearly interdepen-
dent, one of the main tenets of the theory.  Where a broad approach is
taken to defining stakeholders, some stakeholders are not able to be
regarded as part of the interdependence.190  In this light, one thinks of
pressure groups and terrorists where there is no real relationship with
the corporation and its stakeholders, as is presumed with interdepen-
dence.191  According to Fassin, there is unanimity with respect to only
three stakeholders: financiers, employees, and customers.192  It is as-
sumed that shareholders are not included because the research under-
taken by Fassin did not concentrate solely on corporations but took
into account other forms of business.  It is patent that nearly all com-
mentators will include shareholders as stakeholders when addressing
corporations.  An added problem is that once one has identified who
are stakeholders, some stakeholder groups are large and not homoge-
nous.  This creates further difficulties, as we will see shortly, for direc-
tors seeking to balance interests.
A way of responding to this criticism might be to follow a sug-
gestion by John Parkinson, that “stakeholder” should be restricted to
people and groups who enter long-term cooperative relationships with
the corporation.193  This has the advantage of permitting the manag-
ers to have a better idea of knowing who are the stakeholders of the
corporation, and moving away from reliance on legal rights and toward
developing trust.194  The problem might be in determining what a
long-term cooperative relationship entails.
It has not yet been determined, and may be impossible to deter-
mine, the nature and extent of the responsibility that directors have to
each stakeholder.  In a similar vein, John Argenti has pointed out that
it is not clear what stakeholders should expect to get out of a corpora-
tion with which they are involved.195  The response typically is that
188 Campbell, supra note 101, at 448.
189 Id.
190 Fassin, supra note 69, at 120.
191 Id.
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this cannot be outlined in the general as it is matter for the board to
specify and convey it to the stakeholders.196  As far as the earnings of
the corporation are concerned, there is no indication which groups will
receive any benefits.  Shareholder primacy theorists indicate that they
are concerned that if stakeholder theory applies then directors, be-
cause they have no objective guidelines, will act in a self-interested
fashion.
C. Problem of Balancing
The theory presupposes the fact that directors will, when mak-
ing decisions and running the corporation, balance the interests of all
stakeholders.  This is necessary as stakeholders will often have con-
flicting interests, so balancing is a critical aspect of the theory.  The
idea of balancing interests appears to be an attractive and reasonable
way of dealing with constituencies with conflicting interests.  But, in
fact, stakeholder management involves, in the words of adherents to
the theory, “a neverending task of balancing and integrating multiple
relationships and multiple objectives.”197  Thus, the primary argument
mounted against the stakeholder approach is that the requirement
that directors have to balance the interests of all stakeholders means
they are faced with an impossible task.198  Even Evan and Freeman
have said that the task of the managers is “akin to that of King Solo-
mon.”199  Also, and this is the concern of many, the process of balanc-
ing might lead directors to opportunism, namely benefiting themselves
at the expense of others; or shirking, failing to do their job well, be-
cause directors end up accountable to no one but an amorphous group.
There are several problems directors encounter when engaging
in balancing.  As we have seen, potentially there are a huge number of
stakeholders.  The first problem for managers is ascertaining who are
stakeholders that can be considered in a fair balancing of interests and
claims.  The second is to determine how the directors are to address
the needs of divergent groups.200  This is akin to comparing apples and
oranges.  Further, directors are not always aware of what stakeholders
will consider a benefit, and this is exacerbated by the fact that even
within a particular stakeholder group there may be different views
196 Id. at 448.
197 R. Edward Freeman & J. McVea, A Stakeholder Approach to Strategic Man-
agement, in HANDBOOK OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT, 194 (M. Hitt, R. Edward Free-
man & J. Harrison eds., 2001).
198 See generally B. SHENFIELD, COMPANY BOARDS, Ch. 7 (George Allen & Unwin,
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and attitudes.201  How can managers know what stakeholders con-
sider a benefit or what they see as within their interests?202  As men-
tioned above, groups are not marked by homogeneity, so this creates
further difficulties for directors seeking to balance.
Not only is the board balancing different stakeholder groups, it
may also have to balance within groups.  Take creditors as an exam-
ple.  Corporations might have all or any of the following creditors: se-
cured creditors, suppliers with the benefit of a retention of title clause
in their supply contracts, suppliers without the benefit of such a
clause, general trade creditors, suppliers under long-term contracts,
lessors, holders of unexpired intellectual property licences, employees
owed wages, tax authorities, tort victims with claims, and customers
who have paid deposits for goods or services not yet supplied by the
corporation.  There is, for instance, likely to be a significant difference
between the interests of a bank who is a creditor with a security inter-
est over corporation assets, compared with an unsecured trade credi-
tor.  In considering creditor interests, what does a director do if the
interests of different groups do not accord?   There is going to be con-
flict within groups themselves, and this internecine conflict can be as
difficult to resolve as the group versus group conflict.
Returning to the problem of a lack of homogeneity within the
same group, we can note that often members of sub-groups might not
even have the same interests.  For instance, let us take the broad sub-
grouping of trade creditors.  These creditors are generally treated in
the same way by the law, and certainly they are when it comes to a
liquidation of an insolvent corporation.  This sub-group might include,
at one extreme, large corporations that supply significant quantities of
goods to the corporation, and, at the other end of the spectrum, self-
employed tradespersons, like plumbers, who do the occasional job for
the corporation when it is necessary.  The former type of creditors
might have a turnover of many millions of dollars/pounds/euro/yen per
annum and are likely to be more willing to accept the directors em-
bracing ventures and actions that involve a greater amount of risk.
The reason is that large corporation suppliers are probably not as reli-
ant as the tradespersons, whose turnover is likely to be only in the
region of thousands of dollars/pounds/euro/yen, on being paid the debt
owed.  While the large corporation can, in effect, gamble with its debt,
tradespersons cannot.  The latter would prefer to be assured of receiv-
ing, say half of what is owed, rather than seeing corporation funds
used in such a way that might lead to full payment of the debt but
could just as likely lead to no funds being left to pay creditors on liqui-
dation.  In contrast, the large corporation might be ready to approve of
201 Letza et al., supra note 35, at 255
202 Sternberg, supra note 131, at 4.
2010] STAKEHOLDER THEORY IN CORPORATE LAW 279
directors engaging in what is, effectively, gambling because if it does
not get paid, it can still survive.
Stakeholder theorists assert that corporations need to engage
with stakeholders to ascertain their interests and needs, but the prac-
tical concern is: how is this to be done, especially as managers are not
going to be aware of the existence of some stakeholders when the
stakeholding category is defined widely?
A third issue is: What does balancing actually entail?  Does it
mean embracing compromise or taking such action that enables the
interests of stakeholders to coincide?203 The former might not be ac-
ceptable to many, and might leave some disenchanted, and the latter
does not, for the most part, appear to be possible.  In this respect, a
concern for directors is to know the basis on which they are to balance
interests.  How do directors deal with the case where several constitu-
encies are deserving, but it is impossible to favor them all equally?
One particular problem identified by many scholars is that it is often
not possible to advance the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders
in conjunction with those of the shareholders.204  There is no specifica-
tion, or even guidance, given to managers permitting them to identify
the values relied on in with the stakeholding approach, and there is no
indication how these are to inform their decision-making.205  There are
no standards devised for assigning relative weight to the interests of
the constituencies involved and no criteria for solving problems.206  Ef-
fectively, directors are presented with “standardless discretion.”207
This is emphasised by Ronald Mitchell who stated that the extent to
which priority is given by managers to particular stakeholders whose
claims are in conflict with others cannot be explained by the stake-
holder framework as complex issues are involved.208  Michael Jensen
has stated, in the context of directors having to consider all interests
and to balance them: “It is logically impossible to maximize in more
than one dimension at the same time.”209  Jensen’s concern is that
there is no objective on which a manager can focus, thus leading to
confusion.210  In response to Jensen’s criticism of the theory as confus-
203 See generally BARBRA SHENFIELD, COMPANY BOARD 149 (George Allen & Unwin
Ltd, 1971).
204 See Amir Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values
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206 DONALDSON, supra note 135, at 45.
207 Mitchell, supra note 1, at 589.
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ing for managers, Professor Amir Licht takes the view that Jensen is
depicting managers as being unable to “walk and chew gum at the
same time.”211  But, in fairness to Jensen’s point, there is little gui-
dance, as we have seen, and even experienced managers might ask
where they should start in balancing interests when difficult decisions
have to be made.
John Parkinson’s view on this point is that:
There seems no reason in principle why management
performance cannot be effectively evaluated by reference
to multiple standards.  What is required is an indepen-
dent process of review that is capable of discriminating
between management actions that result from incompe-
tence or the pursuit of self-interest on the one hand, and
those motivated by attempts to accommodate the legiti-
mate interests of affected parties on the other.212
However, the response from shareholder primacists would
likely be that directors might be able to muddy the waters in such a
way as to leave a reviewer, possibly a judge, unable to come to the view
that the directors have not at least attempted to benefit one
stakeholder.
The lack of direction is further exemplified by what the Su-
preme Court of Canada said in the recent case of BCE Inc v 1976 De-
bentureholders.213  It said that there is no legal principle that one set
of interests should prevail over another.214  Then the Court said that
which set prevails depends on the situation that is before the directors,
and they have to use their business judgment.215  Again, no guidance
whatsoever is provided, especially concerning what weight is to be
given to particular interests.  Some scholars would say that judges are
envisaged as the reviewers of what directors do, and it is not possible
for judges to be involved in passing judgment on what directors have
done, in using their commercial judgment, as judges lack, inter alia,
competence.  But this is an overly restricted opinion of the caliber of
modern common law judges, many of whom specialised in commercial
and/or corporate law while in practice, and, arguably, are able to grasp
211 Licht, supra note 204, at 731.
212 John Parkinson, Models of the Company and the Employment Relationship 41
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managerial issues if assisted by suitable oral and documentary
evidence.216
It is argued that arriving at a set of values that accounts for
the concerns across a heterogeneous group of stakeholders requires
managers to fulfil unrealistic expectations.217  Furthermore, as men-
tioned above, it is contended by many scholars that it is not in fact
possible to advance the interests of non-shareholding stakeholders in
conjunction with those of the shareholders.218  To adapt what Michael
Jensen has said, one cannot possibly seek to develop benefits for more
than one constituent at the same time.219  Balancing is made difficult
by the fact that contracts are incomplete the constituencies of a corpo-
ration will usually have conflicting claims, and each constituency will
be subject to the opportunistic actions of other constituencies.220  This
complicates any decisions that the directors are to make in balancing
interests.
The challenge for stakeholder theory is to specify how manag-
ers are to balance between stakeholders.  A critical element for stake-
holder theory is the need to satisfy legitimate expectations of all
stakeholders.  A vague requirement that such expectations are to be
taken into account does not provide guidance, but leaves the managers
none-the-wiser and, perhaps, even more confused.221  Even with the
best of intentions, it would be very difficult for directors to know the
best interests of individual stakeholders.  This is exacerbated by the
fact that stakeholders in a corporation will be continually changing,
and the expectations of existing ones could be revised.  Added to this is
the fact that a long-term approach is championed by stakeholder the-
ory, requiring managers to look not to present interests, but to the fu-
ture.  This is not an easy task, particularly when one accepts that
216 See Keay, supra note 89.  A good example of judges who specialise are the
judges of the Companies Court in the Chancery Division of the High Court of En-
gland.  Another is the judges of the Chancery Court in the State of Delaware.
217 Sundaram & Inkpen, supra note 171, at 353.
218 Licht, supra note 204, at 686 n.126.
219 Jensen, supra note 205, at 301.
220 Blair & Stout, supra note 43, at 276–287.  The answer, according to the com-
mentators pursuant to what they call “the team production theory,” is that the
board must make the ultimate decisions in reconciling competing interests and
disputes. Id. at 276–277.
221 Jensen, supra note 205, at 301.  Judges who have to consider this issue in rela-
tion to claims made that a company’s affairs have been conducted oppressively or
in an unfairly prejudicial manner often find it onerous. See, e.g. Companies Act,
2006, 46 § 994 (U.K.); Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., ch. C-44 (1985);
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stakeholders themselves are likely not to be able to articulate their
long-term interests.222
The fact is that during the life of a corporation some stakehold-
ers will be more important to a corporation than others.  If this is so,
are directors to take this into account in balancing interests?  If they
do they might be subject to claims of unethical conduct, but if they do
not they might hamper the success of the corporation.  Of course, the
more stakeholder groups there are in a corporation, the more difficult
it is, potentially, for directors to take all interests into account in what
they propose to do.
The danger is that in some circumstances the directors are in a
“no win situation” and might feel that the preferable thing to do is
nothing.  Kenneth Goodpaster is concerned that the stakeholder ap-
proach is likely to push “decision-making towards paralysis because of
the dilemmas posed by divided loyalties and, in the final analysis, rep-
resents nothing less than the conversion of the modern private corpo-
ration into a public institution . . . .”223  Ultimately, this could
prejudice all stakeholders.
As noted earlier, it is quite possible that a person can be a con-
stituent of more than one stakeholder group, for instance an employee
might also be a customer, and the theory fails to determine in which
capacity he or she is to be included in the managers’ balancing calcula-
tion.224  Members of the same group might not agree on what is a ben-
efit for that group,225 so how are managers in fact to make a
determination?  Further, directors have the dual responsibility of de-
ciding who is a stakeholder and then implementing their decision,
which leaves room for self-dealing.
It might be argued that the need to engage in balancing can
exacerbate the transaction costs of corporations.  However, stake-
holder theorists might counter that the trust engendered between cor-
porations and their stakeholders can reduce costs as stakeholders will
not feel the need to require the same checks and balances as they
would if management were pursuing a different approach.
One specific concern that writers have with balancing is where
the managers are identified as stakeholders, for it is the managers
222 SANDRA S. BERNS, COMPANY LAW AND GOVERNANCE: AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPEC-
TIVE 149 (Oxford Univ. P. 1998).
223 Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Business Ethics and Stakeholder Analysis, in THE
CORPORATION AND ITS STAKEHOLDERS: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 115
(M. Clarkson ed., 1998).
224 Sternberg, supra note 131, at 4.
225 Id. at 5.
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who will usually be required to do the balancing.226  If they have a
stakeholder role, are they then not judges in their own cause?  But
many will regard managers as a mediating body between the stake-
holder groups, rather than stakeholders per se.227  This latter ap-
proach is certainly to be preferred because they cannot take their
interests into account in balancing.  Of course, the sceptic might say
that the managers would take their interests into account first before
doing any balancing whatsoever.
While balancing seems meritorious, in practice it would be very
difficult for a director, in many situations, to know what to do.  The
main problem is that balancing is a nebulous idea unless there is a
goal that has been set for the balancing exercise.  To what end is the
balancing to be directed?  To be effective any balancing must be done
in the context of achieving an aim.  The problem is that “[a]dvocates of
traditional stakeholder theory . . . hand managers a theory that makes
purposeful decisions impossible.  And, with no way to keep score,
stakeholder theory forces managers to be unaccountable for the very
actions through which they were to be evaluated.”228
Another leading argument against the theory, and based on
the notion that directors have to consider many interests, is that direc-
tors are given licence to do whatever they like, and that state of affairs
is likely to lead to directors, as rational actors, engaging in either or
both of two kinds of behavior.  The first is opportunistic activity: direc-
tors taking the opportunity to benefit themselves at the expense of
others.  The second is shirking: not devoting their best efforts to the
tasks at hand.  These kinds of activity are possible because directors
end up accountable to no one (known as the “too many masters” prob-
lem).  Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel have
stated that “[a] manager who is told to serve two masters (a little for
the equity holders, a little for the community) has been freed of both
226 See Philip Coelho et al., The Social Responsibility of Management: A Reprise 18
MID-AMERICAN J. OF BUS. 51, 53 (2003).
227 Lawrence. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate Governance, 45 VAND. L. REV.
1263, 1272 (1992); see Stephen Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and
Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003); see also Ronald Co-
lombo, Ownership, Limited: Reconciling Traditional and Progressive Corporate
Law via an Aristotelian Understanding of Ownership, 34 J. CORP. L. 247, 249
(2008).
228 Thomas Donaldson, The Stakeholder Revolution and the Clarkson Principles,
12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 107 (2002); see also F. Robins, Why Corporate Social Responsi-
bility Should be Popularised but not Imposed, 8 CORP. GOVERNANCE 330, 333
(2007).
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and is answerable to neither. . . .  Agency costs rise and social wealth
falls.”229
It is likely that “[a]ll but the most egregious self-serving mana-
gerial behavior will doubtless serve the interests of some stakeholder
constituencies and work against the interests of others . . . .”230  Hence,
directors can mount a credible defence in relation to what they have
done and can play off one group against another. They can claim that
after balancing interests they made a decision to benefit stakeholders
X and Y, and this decision just happened to benefit or protect them-
selves.  It is difficult to impugn the decision.  Professor Oliver Hart
says that requiring managers to consider the interests of all constitu-
encies “is essentially vacuous, because it allows management to justify
almost any action on the grounds that it benefits some group.”231  In
such a system the directors are arguably given unfettered discretion
that cannot be monitored.  The concern is that directors will pay lip-
service to the need to consider the interests of stakeholders, and then
make the decision that they want, possibly based on self-interest.
There is the general point that directors should not be permitted to
decide what to do with corporation assets and its business based on
caprice because they should be accountable for what they do with other
people’s property.  While it has been said that managers will be more
accountable and subjected to greater monitoring if they have to take
into account all stakeholders,232 it makes sense to say that if they have
a responsibility to a lot of stakeholders they virtually become account-
able to no one.233  Consequently, one of the problems is to ascertain
how one can make directors sufficiently accountable.
The riposte from the adherents of stakeholder theory might be
that the view expressed in the last paragraph is too cynical, and man-
agers, as professionals, will be concerned about their reputation and
integrity and will refrain from acting opportunistically or shirking.
Stakeholderism states that we have to rely upon the trustworthiness
of the directors.  Professors Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, amongst
others, point out there is ample evidence from behavioral theory of
people acting altruistically and sacrificing selfish interests to achieve a
result that benefits others, and this is consistent with ethical behav-
229 FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPO-
RATE LAW 38 (Harv. Univ. Press, 1991); see also Jensen, supra note 205, at 305.
230 Alexei M. Marcoux, Balancing Act, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BUSINESS ETHICS
97 (J. DesJardins & J. McCall eds., 2000).
231 Oliver Hart, An Economist’s View of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U. TORONTO L.J.299,
303 (1993).
232 Kent Greenfield, A New Era for Corporate Law, in PAPER SERIES ON CORPO-
RATE DESIGN, 19, 23 (Allen White & Marjorie Kelly, eds. 2007), available at http://
www.corporation2020.org/pdfs/SummitPaperSeries.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2010).
233 Blair, supra note 26, at 225.
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ior.234  Under the stewardship theory, embraced by many favoring
stakeholder theory or something akin to it, there is a focus on direc-
tors’ need for achievement, responsibility, recognition, altruism, and
respect for authority.  As a result, they can be seen not as opportunis-
tic, but as good stewards who will act in the best interests of the
stakeholders.
The issue boils down to a philosophical debate.  The share-
holder primacy school says that you cannot trust directors because
human nature is such that it will want to seek benefits at every possi-
ble turn (and you must have tight monitoring measures in place),
whereas the stakeholder theory school states that while there will be
some improper actions by directors, generally they will be fair, can be
trusted, and will act in good faith, making them good stewards of the
corporation.  The latter view asserts that directors have other motives
beyond self-interest including professionalism, satisfaction in perform-
ing well, and respect for authority.
Another concern is that in the United States and some other
jurisdictions, such as Australia,235 directors are protected by the busi-
ness judgment rule.236  In the United States the business judgments of
directors are only reviewed in extraordinary circumstances237 because
of the business judgment rule which might be regarded as U.S. corpo-
rate law’s central doctrine,238 and pervades every aspect of corporate
law in the United States.239  The rule takes the focus of the court from
whether the director made the correct decision to whether the director
adhered to adequate and appropriate processes that led to the deci-
sion.  Consequently, it is said to provide a “safe harbor” for directors.
So, American directors are entitled to rely on the business judgment
rule if they can establish, in relation to the particular judgment in
question, that: they exercised a business judgment (including a deci-
sion to refrain from taking action); the judgment was made in good
faith for a proper purpose; they did not have a material personal inter-
est in the subject matter of the judgment, so that there was no conflict
of interest; they informed themselves about the subject matter of the
judgment to the extent that they reasonably believed to be appropri-
234 Margaret Blair & Lynn. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role
of the Corporate Board,79 WASH U. L.Q. 403,  438–39 (2001).
235 Corporations Act, 2001, c. 180(2) (Austl.).
236 See, e.g., In re Healthco Int’l Inc. 208 B.R. 288, 306 (Mass. 1997). See also
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS § 4.01 (Am. Law Inst., Tentative draft No. 1 1982).
237 David Rosenberg, Galactic Stupidity and the Business Judgment Rule, 32 J.
CORP. L. 301, 301–02 (2007).
238 See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 241
(Foundation Press 2002).
239 Id. at 301.
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ate;240 and they rationally believed that the judgment was in the best
interests of the corporation.241  The presumption is that the director
had acted properly and it is the job of the plaintiff to rebut this pre-
sumption.242  If the plaintiff can do so, then the director has to estab-
lish the fairness of the transaction that is impugned.243
The rule is designed to preserve directors’ discretion and to
protect the directors from courts using hindsight to find them liable.
The rule provides, in a nutshell, that courts will not substitute their
business judgment for that of the informed, reasonable director who
acts bona fide in the best interests of the corporation,244 and an action
will fail even if the claimant can demonstrate that the action of the
directors has caused loss to the corporation, unless the director’s ac-
tions do not meet the aforementioned qualities.245  So, a U.S. director
cannot be held liable if he or she makes a bad judgment or a decision
which he or she makes is unsuccessful, provided the above factors can
be established on his or her behalf.246  In the context of our discussion,
it means that in the United States if a director has acted in good faith
then it will not matter whose interests have been enhanced.
While the business judgment rule does not apply in the United
Kingdom, a derivation of it arguably does.247  The courts do not second
guess what directors have done.  In fact, U.K. judges have consistently
240 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. 634 A.2d 345, 369–70 (Del. 1993) (holding
that the directors failed to reach an informed decision).
241 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS § 4.01 (Am. Law Inst., Tentative draft No. 1 1982). See, e.g, Parnes v.
Bally Entm’t, 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999) (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 812 (Del. 1984)); see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 238, at 274–75.
242 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 238, at 269–70 (asserting that the Business Judgment
Rule is really an assumption and not a presumption in the “strict evidentiary
sense” of presumption).
243 Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 BUS. LAW. 625, 628
(2000).
244 See, e.g., Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 774 (Del. 1990); Moran v. House-
hold Int’l Inc. 500 A. 2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
812 (Del. 1984); Richard Cieri et al., The Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Finan-
cially Troubled Companies, 3 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 405, 408 (1994).
245 David Millon, Why Is Corporate Management Obsessed with Quarterly Earn-
ings and What Should Be Done About It?, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 890, 903–04
(2002).
246 Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982).
247 THE LAW COMMISSION, COMPANY DIRECTORS: REGULATING CONFLICTS OF INTER-
EST AND FORMULATING A STATEMENT OF DUTIES, 1999, LC261, at 286. See also
Company Law Review, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Devel-
oping the Framework ( DTI, 2000) at ¶ 3.69–3.70 (determining statutory state-
ment rule would add complexity by being overly harsh in some cases and giving
too much leeway in others).
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refrained from reviewing business judgments made by directors,248
and thus they have protected directors from the use of judicial hind-
sight.  In the United Kingdom, directors are required under section
172 of the Companies Act 2006 to act in the way that they consider, in
good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of their com-
pany for the benefit of the members as a whole and in doing so they are
to have regard for:
(a) The likely consequences of any decision in the long
term;
(b) the interests of the company’s employees;
(c) the need to foster the company’s business relation-
ships with suppliers, customers and others;
(d) the impact of the company’s operations on the com-
munity and the environment;
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputa-
tion for high standards of business conduct; and
(f) the need to act fairly between the members of the
company.249
The fact of the matter is that while the provision seems to be
stakeholder-oriented, it is up to the directors, and not the courts, to
decide what should benefit the shareholders and which of the factors
listed, if any, should affect what they decide to do, provided that the
directors act in good faith.250  Except for cases of egregiously bad be-
havior, it is likely to be very difficult to demonstrate that the directors
have breached their duty of good faith.251  It is very difficult, in most
cases, to impugn the actions of someone who is able to state clearly
that he or she believed that what was done was in the corporation’s
best interest.  Directors normally assert that their motives were pure.
Courts will be reluctant to decline to accept oral evidence from direc-
tors concerning their motives, especially because finding the existence
of improper motives is relatively serious.252
248 Rupert Reed, Company Directors – Collective or Functional Responsibility, 27
CO. LAW. 170, 170 n.2 (2006).
249 Companies Act, 2006, 46 § 172(1) (U.K.).
250 Andrew Keay, Enlightened Shareholder Value, the Reform of the Duties of Cor-
poration Directors and the Corporate Objective, LLOYDS MAR. & COM. L.Q. 335,
336 (2006); see generally ANDREW KEAY, DIRECTORS’ DUTIES (Jordan Publishing
2009).
251 PAUL DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIES’ PRINCIPLES OF COMPANY LAW  389 (Sweet &
Maxwell 2003). See also Richard Nolan, The Legal Control of Directors’ Conflicts
of Interest in the United Kingdom: Non-Executive Directors Following the Higgs
Report, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 413, 424 (2005).
252 ROBIN HOLLINGTON, SHAREHOLDERS’ RIGHTS 51 (Sweet & Maxwell 2007).
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Before closing this part of the article we must acknowledge the
fact that there are responses to the concern over the issue of balancing
those constituents with conflicting interests.  First, it might be said
that balancing is part and parcel of being a director.  Some manage-
ment specialists have even said that managing competing interests is
a primary function of management.253  The fact that balancing diverse
interests is within directors’ abilities and skills is something that has
been recognised as far back as 1973 by a U.K. Department of Trade
and Industry Report,254 and by some American courts.255  It is not un-
manageable or unreasonable for persons occupying positions like di-
rectors to make allocative decisions.  Directors have been classified as
fiduciaries, and society regularly requires those who are fiduciaries to
make balanced decisions that can be quite difficult.256  Proponents of
this view might point to another kind of fiduciary: the trustee.  Trust-
ees have to make investment decisions sometimes with various catego-
ries of beneficiaries in mind.  This can involve weighing risk in a
similar manner that is required by a director under a duty to consider
creditor interests when his or her corporation is insolvent.257  It usu-
ally involves the steering of a middle course, whatever that might en-
tail in a given case.
Second, although balancing might be demanding, there is evi-
dence that directors are often seeking to balance interests in the deci-
sions they make.258  A corporate reputation survey of Fortune 500
corporations (the largest listed corporations in the United States)
found that satisfying the interests of one stakeholder does not auto-
matically mean it is at the expense of other stakeholders.259  It might
253 H. IGOR ANSOFF, IMPLANTING STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT (Prentice-Hall 1984);
see also Jeffrey Harrison & R. Edward Freeman, Stakeholders, Social Responsibil-
ity and Performance: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Perspectives, 42 ACAD.
OF MGMT. J. 479, 479 (1999).  Management commentators have asserted that di-
rectors are in effect to act as referees between two stakeholder groups; see also
MASAHIKO. AOKI, THE CO-OPERATIVE GAME THEORY OF THE FIRM (1984).
254 Company Law Reform, (London DTI) Cmnd. 5391 at [55]–[59].
255 See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
256 Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Corporate Fiduciary Principles for the Post-Con-
tractarian Era, 23 FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 561, 593 (1996).
257 It might be asserted, with some merit, that directors and trustees are regarded
differently in a number of ways.  For example, a trustee is not permitted to engage
in the same amount of risk-taking as directors, whose role is partly en-
trepreneurial. See ANDREW KEAY, DIRECTORS’ DUTIES, supra note 250, at 18–21.
258 It has been noted that directors do already consider the interests of various
constituents. See Janet Dine, Implementation of European Initiatives in the UK:
The Role of Fiduciary Duties, 3 COMPANY. FIN. & INSOLVENCY L. REV. 28, 223
(1999).
259 See generally Lee E. Preston & Harry J. Sapienza, Stakeholder Management
and Corporate Performance, 19 J. BEHAV. ECON. 361 (1990).
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be concluded that considering the interests of non-shareholding stake-
holders are considered does not necessarily mean that shareholders’
interests will be prejudiced.  It has been found empirically, in a study
of U.K. private water companies, that the requirement that directors
consider customer interests as well as that of shareholders can result
in “mutual benefits for different stakeholder groups with apparently
conflicting economic interests.”260  For instance, if directors take into
account stakeholder interests by reviewing all available material in-
formation relating to the corporation before embarking on any actions,
shareholders might well benefit in that the corporation might be
spared from pursuing an inappropriate strategy.  Further, in under-
taking the necessary monitoring to protect stakeholder interests, di-
rectors could identify improvements in the corporation’s affairs,
thereby promoting overall benefits for the corporation.261
Third, even with shareholder primacy it is necessary for direc-
tors to engage in some balancing.  Shares come in different shapes and
sizes, and corporations often have different kinds of shares, such as
ordinary (common) and preferred, and it is incumbent on directors to
balance the interests of different kinds of shareholders, so that they
act fairly between them262 as, on occasions, these different classes of
shareholders have opposing interests.263  Some preferred shareholders
may have interests that resemble those of fixed claimants, such as
creditors, more than those associated with ordinary (common) share-
holders.264  Some shareholders intend only to retain shares for a short
term, while others are in for the long haul.  Other shareholders hold a
diversified portfolio, with their investment spread around a number of
corporations, and still others might have all their investment concen-
260 Stuart Ogden & Robert Watson, Corporate Performance and Stakeholder Man-
agement: Balancing Shareholder and Customer Interests in the UK Privatized
Water Industry, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 526, 536 (1999).
261 Empirical evidence, obtained in a study by the Financial Times of Europe’s
most respected companies, found that chief executive officers were of the view that
one of the features of a good company was the ability to balance the interests of
stakeholder groups.  Of course, most of the non-UK companies surveyed would
favor a stakeholder approach to corporate governance. Eileen Scholes & David
Clutterbuck, Communication with Stakeholders: An Integrated Approach, 31 LONG
RANGE PLAN. 227, 230 (1998).
262 See Mills v. Mills, 60 C.L.R. 150, 164 (1938); Re BSB Holdings Ltd. (No. 2),
[1996] 1 B.C.L.C. 155, 246–49.
263 See Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205,
273 (1998); see also Campbell, supra note 256, at 593; Royce de R. Barondes, Fidu-
ciary Duties of Officers and Directors of Distressed Corporations, 7 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 45, 78 (1998).
264 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffery P. Miller, Corporate Stakeholders: A Con-
tractual Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 401, 433 (1993).
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trated in the one corporation.  Notwithstanding this, no concerns are
voiced about the stresses of decision-making for directors in undertak-
ing a balancing of the interests of the various types of shareholders,
nor is it argued that directors, in balancing those interests, are too
burdened.
D. Unworkable
The problem that exists when there is a large and apparently
untrammelled stakeholder grouping, something that underlies the ma-
terial considered in the previous two sections of the article, is that the
concept is unworkable.  There are a huge number of potential stake-
holders where large corporations are concerned, and the problem for a
board is to determine how they are to address the needs of divergent
groups.265
It has always been perceived that one of the strengths of the
shareholder primacy position, certainly when compared with stake-
holder theory, has been that it provides greater certainty and it is
workable.266  In fact, one of the main arguments against the stake-
holder theory is that it has problems when it comes to application—it
is indecisive and imprecise.  Elaine Sternberg has said that the “essen-
tial principle of stakeholder theory that corporations are accountable
to all their stakeholders” is something that is “unworkable.”267
The Hampel Report, delivered in 1998 as part of the develop-
ment of a corporate governance code in the United Kingdom, stated
that having directors’ duties defined in:
[T]erms of the stakeholders would mean identifying all
the various stakeholder groups; and deciding the extent
and nature of the directors’ responsibility to each.  The
result would be that the directors were not effectively ac-
countable to anyone since there would be no clear yard-
stick by which to judge their performance.  This is a
recipe neither for good governance nor for corporate
success.268
The approach in stakeholder theory is to incorporate values as
a critical aspect of the strategic management process, but the riposte
from shareholder primacy advocates is: how do managers identify
these values and how are they to inform decision-making?269  They ar-
gue that arriving at a set of values that accounts for the concerns that
265 Leung, supra note 110, at 621.
266 This is debatable. See Keay, supra note 32.
267 Sternberg, supra note 131, at 5.
268 ROBERT HAMPEL, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE (1998), ¶ 1.17.
269 Sundaram & Inkpen, supra note 171, at 353.
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exist across a heterogeneous group of stakeholders requires managers
to fulfil unrealistic expectations.270
The Company Law Review Steering Group (“CLRSG”), estab-
lished in 1998 to examine U.K. company law and recommend reform
measures, was against stakeholder theory (it referred to it as “plural-
ism”)271 because:
[I]n particular that this would impose a distributive eco-
nomic role on directors in allocating the benefits and bur-
dens of management of the company’s resources; that
this role would be uncontrolled if left to directors in the
form of a power or discretion; and that a similarly broad
role would be imposed on the judges if the new arrange-
ment took the form of an enforceable obligation confer-
ring rights on all the interested parties to argue for their
interests in court.272
Frederick, Davis, and Post have sought to make stakeholder
theory work, and they have proposed several stages in conducting
stakeholder analysis, namely: mapping stakeholder relationships,
mapping stakeholder coalitions, assessing the nature of each stake-
holder interest, assessing the nature of each stakeholder’s power, con-
structing a matrix of stakeholder priorities, and monitoring shifting
coalitions.273  The problem is that this involves an extremely compli-
cated and time-consuming enterprise which is, arguably, not an ap-
proach managers can adopt when faced with the rigours of decision-
making and managing of complex corporations.  Even if one can carry
out what these scholars recommend, it is highly debatable whether it
would facilitate the decision-making of the directors.  The theory pro-
vides that directors are to be accountable to all stakeholders, but that
is not possible.  As we have seen earlier, what happens with large cor-
porations which have many stakeholders is that the managers become
accountable to no one;274  managers are able to defend allegations that
they have failed to act properly by asserting that they have sought to
balance stakeholder interests.
270 Id. at 353.
271 See DEAN, supra note 37, at 93.  Arguably pluralism differs in some respects
from stakeholder theory.  Dr Janice Dean states that the former implies diversity
and conflict while the latter emphasises inclusivity. Nevertheless, there are many
similarities.
272 Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competi-
tive Economy: Developing the Framework, ¶ 2.12 (2000).
273 Gerald Vinten, Shareholder v. Stakeholder—Is There A Governance Dilemma?,
9 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 36, 41 (2001) (citing W. FREDERICK ET AL.,
BUSINESS AND SOCIETY (McGraw-Hill 1988)).
274 Sternberg, supra note 131, at 4.
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Many stakeholder theorists argue that to make stakeholder
theory work it is necessary to have stakeholders represented on the
board of directors, thereby providing, inter alia, procedural justice.275
As with corporations in some European states and elsewhere, it is said
that employees should have director representatives on boards or
works councils that have a part to play in the decision-making process.
But how could one possibly have some form of representation from all
stakeholders on one board?  Assuming one can determine who the
stakeholders in the corporation are, a difficult task as already noted,
there is likely to be too many stakeholder groups, even if one applies
the narrow approach to the definition of stakeholder, for all of them to
be represented.  In the 1970s Ralph Nader recognized the fact that it
seemed to be “impossible to design a general ‘interest group’ formula
which will assure all affected constituencies of large industrial corpo-
rations will be represented . . . .”276 In European corporations where
representation occurs, many of the corporations have a two-tier board
system, and representation is on the supervisory board alone, and not
the management board.  The supervisory board can be large and does
not have to be as flexible as the management board or the one tier
board used elsewhere, most notably in Anglo-American jurisdictions.
E. Stakeholders are Protected by Contract and/or Regulation
Shareholder primacy scholars argue that non-shareholding
stakeholders, such as creditors and employees are, unlike sharehold-
ers, adequately protected by contract and/or statutory provisions, so
managers should not manage for the benefit of these stakeholders.277
For instance, stakeholders can provide in the terms of the contracts
which they make with the corporation that they are granted safe-
guards in the nature of governance rights.278  All of this leads to the
argument that if directors are required to take the interests of such
constituencies into account, the constituencies are receiving very spe-
cial, preferential treatment, or “having a second bite of the apple.”
Critics compare this to shareholders who have no such benefits.
Stakeholder theorists usually take issue with the general as-
sertion that constituencies are able to protect themselves by the terms
of the contracts that they make.  It is acknowledged that some groups,
275 See, e.g., Phillips, Freeman & Wicks, supra note 49.
276 D. Gordon Smith, The Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law, 56 EMORY L.J.
985, 996 (2008) (citing RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 124
(1976)).
277 Hansmann, supra note 9, at 442.
278 G. Kelly & J. Parkinson, The Conceptual Foundations of the Corporation: a
Pluralist Approach, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CORPORATION 118, 118 (J.
Parkinson et al. eds., 2000); see also Fisch, supra note 32.
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such as powerful creditors like banks, might acquire protection via
contract, but most constituencies do not obtain protection for a number
of reasons, such as lack of bargaining power, ignorance, or insufficient
funds to pay necessary professional costs.  In the real world it is infre-
quent to find contractual arrangements made by equals, and many
contracts allow little room for negotiation.  The result is that costs are
imposed on third parties with whom the corporation does business.279
Stakeholder adherents point to the fact that when making contracts,
many stakeholders often suffer from informational asymmetry in that
the managers of corporations know far more than they do, particularly
about the performance and systems of the corporation.  Also, it is
widely reported that the kinds of contracts we are considering are in-
complete.280  This means that there are gaps in the terms and the par-
ties have not envisioned future events.
Besides being protected by contract, shareholder primacists
submit that non-shareholding stakeholders are also safeguarded by
regulatory law, such as employment and consumer laws.281  Stake-
holder theorists usually respond that this is too broad an assertion, as
many laws are of limited or no benefit to stakeholders.282  Even if they
are, stakeholders have to take the initiative to inform regulatory au-
thorities, or take civil action themselves.  This involves a significant
time/cost factor.
F. Enforcement
Adolf Berle observed that if one abandons the focus on share-
holder primacy there needs to be a clear and reasonably enforceable
scheme put in its place.283  Enforcing the stakeholder approach has, as
recognised as far back as the 1930s, significant problems in implemen-
tation.284  Berle was of the view that running corporations for many
constituencies was attractive, but he could not determine how it could
be done.285  He could not see how corporations could be run for stake-
holders, and so that is why he regarded shareholder primacy as the
way forward.286  It was a scheme that allowed for the control of direc-
tors and shareholders.287  Even E. Merrick Dodd, a proponent of an
279 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 126, at 1156.
280 Fisch, supra note 32.
281 Dodd, supra note 111, at 195.
282 Id. at 194.
283 A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1932).
284 E.g., Dodd, supra note 111, at 199.
285 See Berle, supra note 283, at 1368.
286 Id.
287 Id.
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early version of stakeholder theory, acknowledged that there were sig-
nificant problems in implementation of a stakeholder approach to cor-
porate governance.288
Another major problem is enforcing any breach of a stake-
holder approach.289  Do you give the power to anyone who is a stake-
holder to bring proceedings where there is a breach of duty?  Are legal
proceedings appropriate?  The leading problem in this area is that the
breach will usually be perpetrated by one or more directors and it will
hurt the corporation.290  It is trite law across jurisdictions that only
the corporation can enforce any harm done to it.291  As the directors
manage the corporation and have the power to decide whether or not
legal proceedings should be initiated on the part of the corporation, if
they have breached their duties they are unlikely to sanction proceed-
ing against themselves.  In most Anglo-American jurisdictions there is
legislative292 and/or judicial authority that permits shareholders to
take derivative proceedings against the directors and/or other miscre-
ants who have damaged the corporation in order to obtain a judgment
in favour of the corporation.293  But, derivative proceedings will not
help most stakeholders as the only ones who can bring such proceed-
ings, for the most part, are the shareholders.294  Except where they
can see some benefit for them in due course, or they are members of
other stakeholder groups, shareholders, as rational economic actors,
are not likely to be inclined to embark on litigation (which opens them
up to a costs order in most jurisdictions).295
288 Dodd, supra note 111, at 205.
289 Id. at 197.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 See, e.g., Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., ch. 239 (1985); Corpora-
tions Act, 2001, c. 236 (Austl.); Singapore Companies Act, § 216A; New Zealand
Companies Act 1993, No. 105, § 165; Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, (2005)
Cap. 32, § 168BC. (H.K.).
293 For examples from the United States, see, e.g., Kusner v. First Pa. Corp., 395
F. Supp. 276, 280–81 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Dorfman v. Chem. Bank, 56 F.R.D. 363,
364–65 (S.D. N.Y. 1972).
294 But see Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., ch. 238(d) (1985) (includ-
ing, amongst those who may make applications, “any other person who, in the
discretion of a court, is a proper person to make an application.”); Singapore Com-
panies Act, § 216A(1)(c) (providing that the range of persons who can apply for a
derivative action includes “any other person who, in the discretion of the Court, is
a proper person.”).  For further discussion of this issue, see Keay, supra note 89.
295 Shareholders are rarely going to take action to protect other stakeholders.  It is
rare to see activist shareholders succeeding with large corporations.  But recently
some BP shareholders have done this in relation to the company’s investment in
Canada’s oil sands. See Robin Pagnamenta, BP Faces Protest at Oil Sands Devel-
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John Parkinson recognized the enforcement problem when he
said that placing a duty on directors to balance conflicting interests
would:
[P]resent the courts with a near-impossible task . . . not
only would the court need to assess the likely impact on
each group of a contested business policy, in both the
short and the long term, but also it would have to evalu-
ate the policy in accordance with a theory which stipu-
lated when one set of interests should prevail over the
others.296
Even if there were proceedings that could be taken by a stake-
holder, it would be hard to assess if the interests of some stakeholders
have been prejudiced, and then it may well be difficult to quantify the
extent of the loss, so any proceedings could, arguably, only lead to an
award for the corporation, as at present.297
G. Wrong View on Accountability
Elaine Sternberg argues that the stakeholder theory is con-
fused when it comes to the issue of accountability.298  She asserts that
a corporation cannot be accountable to all people, groups, or things
that are related in some way, even if obscurely; and while it may be
said that a corporation should respond to so-called stakeholders such
as employees or suppliers, this does not mean that it is accountable to
them, except where there is some contractual (or legislative) provision
requiring it in some form or another.299  Further, those whose coopera-
tion is sought by a corporation cannot expect the corporation to ac-
count to them.300  If they are not content with what the managers are
doing then they have the option of withdrawing their cooperation.301
opment, THE TIMES, Feb. 7, 2010, available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/
tol/business/industry_sectors/natural_resources/article7018483.ece.
296 J.E. PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 86 (1993).
297 Gregory Scott Crespi, Redefining the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors in
Accordance with the Team Production Model of Corporate Governance, 36 CREIGH-
TON L. REV. 623, 637–41(2003) (attempting to explain how a court might go about
determining whether a stakeholder had been injured by the decision-making of
the directors, and, if so, to what extent.  But, with respect, the process with which
a court would be faced, if the learned commentator’s explanation were applied, is
extremely complex.  Crespi seemed to acknowledge this problem later in the arti-
cle in which his views were asserted as he states that any obligation on a director
in relation to stakeholder interests would have to be an aspirational norm rather
than a legal directive.).
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One response might be that most stakeholders will not be in a position
to withdraw their involvement in the corporation.  For instance, em-
ployees whose skills are inextricably related to what the corporation
does and not easily transferable elsewhere, and suppliers who are
bound to provide goods or services for a prescribed period of time are
instances of stakeholders who cannot end their cooperation in the
short term.
H. Fairness
The value of fairness is often highlighted as an element of
stakeholder theory.302  But, it is argued by some contractarians that
favoring non-shareholding stakeholders when they do not have con-
tractual rights to warrant such favor involves an unfair and illegiti-
mate transfer of value and comes at the expense of the
shareholders.303  It is contended that employing stakeholder theory ig-
nores the free choice that was made to set up the corporation;304 the
establishment of the corporation was engineered by the shareholders,
and they expected the corporation to be their investment.  When con-
tracting, stakeholders are able to “price up” their provision of re-
sources and so protect themselves while shareholders cannot do so.305
It has also been argued that stakeholders are not as vulnerable
as they are often painted to be, so taking into account their interests
means that they are unfairly advantaged.306  It is asserted that non-
shareholding stakeholders do not invest all of their resources in the
corporation at the one time, but incrementally, so if their expectations
are not met or the bargain they struck is not honored, they can with-
draw their investment without substantial loss.307
Another issue of fairness that is relevant is that it is contended
that corporations who wish to engage in stakeholderism are not able to
treat all stakeholders equally.308  It is acknowledged by stakeholder
theory that there will have to be, on occasions, partiality shown.  It
might be said that this, therefore, constitutes unfairness, given that
many regard the theory to be based on Kantian notions of equality.309
302 Millon, supra note 97, at 1.
303 Id.
304 Timothy L. Fort, The Corporation as Mediating Institution: An Efficacious
Synthesis of Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Constituency Statutes, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 173, 187 (1998).
305 Alexei M. Marcoux, A Fiduciary Argument Against Stakeholder Theory, 13
BUS. ETHICS Q. 1, 17 (2003).
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308 Id. at 5 and 19.
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It is always possible that managers could, in purporting to implement
stakeholder theory, choose to favor constituencies which have the best
bargaining strength or political clout, thus furthering their own inter-
ests, and if they did so it would clearly be a breach of the value of
fairness.
I. Inefficient
It has been submitted that if those (the shareholders) who do
not receive the marginal gains from the corporation’s endeavor are not
influencing decision-making, the corporation’s wealth will not be maxi-
mized and, therefore, those involved in the corporation will not bene-
fit.310  The reason for this is that if stakeholders’ interests are to be
taken into account then the directors will have to enter into only those
ventures which will satisfy these interests.  It is likely that these sorts
of ventures will be, generally, low risk as it is not in the interests of
creditors, employees, and others with fixed interests that the corpora-
tion embarks on projects that might produce huge benefits, but are of
high risk.311  This is because most non-shareholding stakeholders will
not benefit from any great successes of the corporation, but will lose
significantly if the risky action fails and the corporation becomes insol-
vent.  It might be contended that limiting the corporation to low risk
activity could stifle the corporation’s opportunities for higher returns,
and the corporation’s resources are not being used efficiently.  This
might curtail social wealth.
J. Vagueness in Promises to Stakeholders
Some assert that directors are obliged to consider stakeholder
interests in order to fulfil implied promises made to stakeholders.312
This assertion suffers from the same or similar problems as it does in
relation to shareholder primacy theory.313  No such promises are gen-
erally ever made to stakeholders, and no contract exists between the
managers and the stakeholders; any contracts are between the corpo-
ration and the stakeholders.314  There is no indication as to the sub-
310 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 229, at 69.
311 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 84, at 348–49 (discussing how shareholders
at times may support the taking of excessive risk at the direct expense of other
stakeholders, particularly creditors, in the hope of realising higher returns, and in
the process running the risk of betting the company away (i.e. the asset substitu-
tion problem)); see also Clifford W. Smith & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Con-
tracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 119 (1979).
312 See Keay, supra note 32, at 27–28.
313 Id. at 44.
314 Of course, the directors could make a contract with stakeholders on behalf of
the company.
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stance of the promise.  For many stakeholders it would be impossible
to establish what directors are to do in relation to them and their in-
terests, and what interests they are to consider and favor.  Take the
community for instance.  As Eugene Schlossberger has stated, “[T]he
ways in which a company should be sensitive to the needs of its com-
munity are complex, flexible, subtle and changing characteristics ill-
suited to a contract.”315  The body of creditors is one of the few stake-
holder groups that might secure promises from management.  In
agreeing to provide funds or credit, creditors might elicit a promise
that directors will engage in certain kinds of contact or refrain from
engaging in others.
Finally, rather than relying on particular promises, some theo-
rists rely upon the fact that managers should consider stakeholder in-
terests out of benevolence.316
VI. CONCLUSION
Stakeholder theory is a theory that determines what should be
the aim of the large public corporation.  After explaining what the the-
ory is, this article has sought to analyze the reasons given for theory,
as well as the arguments that have been raised against it.  Stake-
holder theory purports to bring economics and ethics together, and to
ensure that the interests of all stakeholders are taken into account by
managers when deciding what action should be taken by the corpora-
tion.  Importantly, stakeholders are not to be seen as the means by
which managers maximize the wealth of shareholders; considering
stakeholder interests and benefiting such groups should be seen as an
end in itself.
One of the major disagreements between the two leading theo-
ries that seek to determine what the corporate objective is relates to
the issue of whether the managers can or cannot be trusted.  Can they
be trusted to seek the betterment of the constituencies notwithstand-
ing a lack of certainty in how they are to operate?  The stakeholder
theory relies on the professionalism and trustworthiness of the direc-
tors, while the shareholder primacy theory does not accept this as a
relevant element as it assumes that directors will act opportunistically
or shirk.
It might be argued that implementation is a problem for stake-
holder theory even leaving director opportunism and shirking aside.
Directors who want to act honorably and properly would have diffi-
culty in some situations knowing what to do.  For instance, what if a
course of action will benefit constituencies A, B, and C, but not D and
315 Eugene Schlossberger, A New Model of Business: Dual-Investor Theory, 4 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 459, 463 (1994).
316 Id. at 462.
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E?  Another equally efficient course of action will benefit constituen-
cies A, D and E, but not B and C.  What does the director do?  How do
the directors decide which of the two actions should be taken?  They
cannot benefit all groups, and they have no real guidance as to which
action they should take.  Should they, therefore, take no action at all?
Conceivably, inertia could damage all constituencies.
The stakeholder model is attractive to many people and groups.
It emphasises values like trust and fairness, but it has, recognised as
far back as the 1930s,317 significant problems regarding clarity and
implementation.  Adolf Berle was of the view that running corpora-
tions for many constituencies was appealing, but he could not deter-
mine how it could be done.
The fact is, stakeholder theory has a lot of adherents and con-
tinues to have influence outside of stakeholder oriented jurisdictions,
but, as with many models, it has substantial difficulties.  Chief among
these are: its failure to define who are stakeholders of a corporation;
an inability to explain critical aspects of the theory, such as how direc-
tors are to balance the interests of stakeholders; its lack of clarity; a
failure to articulate how the theory would work; the fact that it strug-
gles to provide a normative basis; and it has not laid down a convinc-
ing answer to how the theory can be enforced.  Arguably, shareholder
primacy is not as attractive from a normative perspective, although it
might be regarded as more pragmatic and workable.  While stake-
holder theory has attractions, normatively speaking, it is not practical,
and it has been argued318 that stakeholder theory, while solving the
problem of shareholder opportunism,319 leads to a more serious prob-
lem of stakeholder opportunism, which can cause corporations to pay a
higher cost for public equity capital,320 because investors are con-
cerned about protecting their investment from rent-seeking by
stakeholders.
So, there are significant points that favor the idea that direc-
tors should balance the interests of all stakeholders.  However, it is
submitted that they are outweighed by the many problems that are
caused by endeavoring to strike a balance between interests.  Clearly,
most commentators, whatever view they take, accept that the balanc-
ing of stakeholder interests is a tricky issue.  It means that directors
317 Dodd, supra note 111, at 199.
318 Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance,
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1440 (2006).
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have to solve what some commentators see as impossible conflicts of
interests.321  The conclusion of this article is that stakeholder theory
does not have what it takes to be the objective of public corporations.
So, if stakeholder theory is lacking, what is the alternative?  Many
would say that it is shareholder primacy, but there are clearly some
convincing arguments that can be mounted against its employment,322
and consequently there needs to be some further thinking about other
viable alternatives.323
321 There are many American commentators who take this view. See, e.g.,
Jonathon R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making
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Jr., Does a Corporation’s Board of Directors Owe a Fiduciary Duty to its Creditors?,
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Inv. Ltd., [1979] 27 O.R.2d 352, 354 (Can.).
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